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The United States Constitution and the American legal system which has stemmed from
it specify the roles of judges, prosecutors, jurors, and other actors within the criminal justice
system. These roles, although they include a certain amount of discretion, prohibit their
occupants from taking justice “into their own hands” by unilaterally deciding whether the law
ought to apply in a given case. These constraints on the roles within the criminal justice system
are justified by the broader democratic, egalitarian political system within which they exist.
However, given the increasing body of evidence which suggests that, far from being egalitarian,
the criminal justice system is heavily influenced by various types of bias, including racial bias,
the constraints on individuals’ roles within the criminal justice system must be critically
reexamined. This thesis, by way of performing such a reexamination, defends the position that to
the extent that racial bias is likely to affect the outcome of a given criminal case, the individual
actors within the system who deal with that case (specifically, the judges and prosecutors), have
the moral right and, in some cases, the moral duty to promote the most substantively just
outcome, even if doing so would require stepping outside the boundaries of their defined roles.
Despite the moral importance of remaining faithful to the boundaries of one’s role, I argue that in
some cases, stepping outside the boundaries of one’s role may actually better serve the purposes
of that role than would remaining faithful to the role’s boundaries.
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Introduction
Under conditions of social injustice, individual moral duties and professional duties may
come into conflict with one another. In this thesis I will examine this topic by focusing on critical
race theory and the moral dilemma for individual actors - judges and prosecutors in particular -
in the United States legal system that results from racialized legal decision-making. I will ground
my thesis in the following empirical claim, largely drawn from critical race theory (CRT): the
law is created, enforced, and adjudicated within a racially unequal society, and as such tends to
reinforce the racial inequities of the society.
This topic is philosophically important because there is generally a disconnect between
the majesty of legal reasoning as it is enshrined in judicial opinions and described in academic
literature, on the one hand, and the historical and current trends in actual criminal procedure, on
the other hand. Although legal reasoning relies on terms and concepts which are, in themselves,
non-discriminatory, and such reasoning is governed by principles which explicitly prohibit
discrimination based on certain factors, the legal system frequently produces outcomes which
cannot be plausibly explained as the results of non-discriminatory reasoning. Conversely, the
variety of legal principles and the open texture of legal language allows actors in the legal system
to justify discriminatory decisions by appealing to non-discriminatory concepts.
I will defend the conclusion that there is a disconnect between legal reasoning and
criminal procedure so stark that it cannot be attributed to mere coincidence or to the
incompetence of a few specific actors, and rather calls into question whether criminal procedure,
as it is practiced, is based on unbiased legal reasoning at all. My thesis will posit that this
disconnect stems from the underdetermination of outcomes by law, which legal realism
describes, combined with the significant role which racial bias plays in determining outcomes.
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In examining the moral import of this claim about the influence of racial bias in criminal
procedure, I will be focusing on judges and prosecutors and the moral duties relevant to their
professional decisions, rather than addressing the question of whether a given citizen is morally
permitted to break the law. Intuition and legal philosophy suggest that actors in the legal system,
judges in particular, have a special allegiance to legal doctrines, greater than that of other
citizens, so by analyzing the moral duties of judges and prosecutors in their roles as such, I plan
to engage with a more controversial, substantive question than that of whether ordinary citizens
can break unjust laws.
The conclusion about this question which I will defend is that in many cases, a judge or
prosecutor is morally permitted or even obligated to act in a way which best accords with justice,
even if such an action would mean contradicting relevant legal doctrines. In order to defend this
conclusion, I will first provide background about contemporary legal theories and their
relationship to my position. Next, I will lay out the set of ethical and empirical background
claims which will serve as the foundation of my argument. After that, in the chapter “The Moral
Duty to Effect Substantive Justice,” I will make a series of arguments defending the position that
individual judges and prosecutors are morally compelled to promote substantively just outcomes
in criminal cases and that the discretion built into the judicial and prosecutorial roles is
insufficient to allow those actors to properly promote substantive justice. The first such argument
will use Robert Cover’s writing about the Fugitive Slave Acts to illustrate that roles within the
criminal justice system are not self-actualizing and that, therefore, each actor must decide to
follow or not to follow their role in each case. After establishing that there is a choice between
maintaining what Cover calls “role fidelity” and violating that role fidelity, I will use Lysander
Spooner’s writing to argue that one ought to choose to violate role fidelity in certain
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circumstances, so as not to allow oneself to be complicit in the perpetration of moral
wrongdoing. Following this, I will elaborate the objection that my argument assumes a positivist
legal philosophy and that under a Dworkinian philosophy in which moral consideration is
internal to the judicial role, my argument fails. I will respond to this objection by showing that
Dworkin’s legal philosophy does not grant enough discretion to allow judges and prosecutors to
promote substantive justice in the contexts in which I recommend it. Next, I will address the
objection that my response to the previously-described objection criticizes ideal theory as such,
even though my position is rooted in ideal theory. To conclude the chapter, I will develop the
objection that I am encouraging people to act as “insurgents” infiltrating the criminal justice
system and then respond to that objection using the doctrine of double effect.
In the next chapter, titled “The Value of Role Fidelity Examined,” I will put forward
several arguments in favor of maintaining role fidelity and respond to those arguments. I will
begin the chapter by creating an argument that role fidelity on the part of judges and prosecutors
is necessary in order to preserve American democracy. I will respond to this argument by
employing Cover’s arguments about the tendency of judges in Fugitive Slave Act cases to inflate
the negative consequences of role infidelity. Next, I will explain John Rawls’ argument that
rules, rather than providing reasons for or against specific actions, define the practices within
which actions are performed, leaving the actor no choice but to follow the rules if they want to
perform that action. I will respond to Rawls’ argument, which clearly challenges the justifiability
of role infidelity, with several arguments of my own. Following this, I will explore Scott
Shapiro’s critical evaluations of different conceptions of authority in order to illustrate the ways
in which my position would jeopardize the valuable functions of authority, as well as the ways in
which my position could coexist with or even improve the functions of authority. After that, I
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will elaborate the views of Kimberley Brownlee, who advocates for role infidelity even more
strenuously than I do, both in order to draw on her arguments for support and in order to mark
off the limits of my position.
Contemporary Legal Theory
I begin with a brief overview of modern conceptions of law and their associated theories
of legal reasoning, which will ground my claims about the role of legal reasoning in criminal
procedure. H.L.A. Hart held a positivist conception of law, under which the law is the set of rules
which are laid down by the legislature in accordance with pre-existing, secondary rules about
how the legislature should operate. Under Hart’s stance, the role of a judge is to make decisions
which accord with the duly-enacted law, regardless of the moral content of the law. However,
due to the open texture of legal language, there are bound to be cases in which the law does not
clearly indicate one outcome. In these cases, Hart asserts, a judge must act as “deputy legislator”
and opt for the outcome which best advances the social and moral aims of the law.
Ronald Dworkin posits a new naturalist conception of law, which parallels Hart’s
positivism but includes a few key differences. Dworkin agrees with Hart that much of law is
made up of rules, whose validity comes from secondary rules which govern legislative and
judicial processes. Dworkin, however, does not believe that in hard cases, judges become
legislators, creating their own law to fill in gaps in the existing law; rather, under his view, there
are principles, whose validity does not rely on secondary rules, embedded in the law, and judges
must uphold these principles in all cases, even when the rules created by the legislature seek to
violate those principles. If, for example, the legislature enacts a rule which limits the right to vote
based on racial criteria, Hart would hold that a judge should strike that rule down, because the
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rule violates the 15th Amendment, which is a secondary rule which constrains the powers of the
legislature. Dworkin would also hold that a judge should strike such a rule down, not only
because the rule would violate the text of the 15th Amendment, but also because the rule would
contradict the binding principle of racial equality enshrined in the law, a principle which draws
some of its force from enumerated anti-racist statutes, but which is not reducible to the set of
those statutes. While Dworkin asserts that principles, such as the one which prohibits racially
discriminatory legislation, are “irreducibly normative,” he does not paint them as mere
reflections of each judge’s moral sensibilities, because a judge must balance competing
principles in a way that is both justifiable from an external perspective and consistent with the
relevant body of precedent.
While Hart and Dworkin’s competing stances operate on the premise that the law is that
which ideally shapes judicial decision-making, the legal realist conception of law rejects this
premise and asserts that the law is that which in fact determines how judges decide cases. Legal
realism, pioneered by Karl Llewelyn and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., holds that in
difficult or novel cases, outcomes are underdetermined by the law, so the judges in such cases
end up making decisions based on personal ideology, psychological bias, or mere arbitrariness.
Critical legal studies takes the phenomenon described by legal realism in which non-legal
factors determine outcomes and ascribes it to the legal system more broadly; whereas legal
realism focuses on the ways in which judges are largely-unconsciously influenced by non-legal
factors, CLS asserts that the legislature, the police, prosecutors, jurors, and the judiciary all tend
to use their discretion to reinforce existing socioeconomic inequities. Critical race theory holds a
similar position, except that it examines the ways in which the legal system tends to reinforce
racism (as well as making more broadly historical and anthropological claims about the role of
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racism in American society). Feminist jurisprudence uses the same framework as CLS and CRT
to examine the ways in which the legal system tends to reinforce misogyny. My thesis will be
motivated by the claims of CRT in particular.
Of the above-described conceptions of law, Dworkin’s new naturalism will likely provide
the strongest objection to my argument. The discretion which Dworkin’s view gives judges to
interpret and enforce unwritten principles breaks down the positivist division between the
validity of law and the morality of law, which thereby threatens the distinction I make between
legal reasoning and legal practice; if principles, which attempt to ensure that legal practice is
substantively just, are an essential element of legal reasoning, legal reasoning and legal practice
cannot be disconnected in the morally relevant way that I assert they are. While I will delve
deeper into this objection in my thesis, I will likely respond to the objection in a way which
highlights the difference between the idealist conceptions of law presented by positivism and
new naturalism and the realist conceptions of law (including CRT). The principles which ensure
that legal reasoning translates into just practice are binding and valid elements of the law, under
Dworkin’s view, but they are not self-actuating; they require judges to implement them, which
leaves this Dworkinian objection vulnerable to the above-described legal realist argument that
theories of legal reasoning are not in fact outcome-determinative in every case. This
normative/empirical distinction appears to hold “all the way down:” from Dworkin’s standpoint,
a judge who violated the principle of racial non-discrimination would be contradicting a bona
fide element of the law, but this normative claim does not change the empirical claims about
racial discrimination which ground my thesis, so the normative claim does not preempt the moral
claims about judges and prosecutors which I will make in my thesis. In my thesis, I will
elaborate further Dworkinian objections which could be leveled against the foregoing response.
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Background Claims
I will now describe the ethical and empirical claims against which the argument of this
thesis will be grounded. By stipulating a set of ethical claims, including both metaethical and
substantive moral assertions, I will preempt objections which would hold that under certain
metaethical or substantive moral views, my argument is incorrect or simply irrelevant. In
addition, by stipulating a set of empirical claims, I will preempt potential objections which would
hold that my argument is simply based on false empirical claims.
Beginning with the ethical claims, I will stipulate that the justice system should not be
racist and, more broadly, that one’s race should not affect their life prospects. These substantive
moral claims, intuitive as they may be, are necessary to my thesis because if preserving racial
bias were taken to be morally neutral or good, my arguments would be prima facie incorrect.
Beyond this, I will leave open the range of normative theories and substantive moral claims,
because I do not wish to beg the question or paint my arguments as self-evident.
The core empirical claim of my argument is that racial bias1 plays a significant role in
determining outcomes within the criminal justice system. I will not venture to make statistical
claims about the likelihood of racial bias influencing a given criminal case or the percent of
judges and prosecutors who perform their jobs in a racially biased manner, but I will provide
some support for the above general claim about racial bias.
Firstly, there is a body of evidence which shows that outcomes in the criminal justice
system are racially disparate: currently, white people make up 42% of death row inmates and
black people make up 41% of death row inmates, despite the fact that 73% of the United States
1 When I use the term “bias,” here and throughout the thesis, I am using it in an expansive sense, referring to implicit
and explicit psychological bias, as well as prejudice, bigotry, discrimination, and the like. Although each of these
terms has a distinct meaning, I have chosen to group them all together under the term “bias,” because this thesis is
about the moral import of racially-impacted decision-making, not about the ontology or psychological basis of such
decision-making.
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population is white, while only 13% of the population is black2. Not only does the race of the
defendant appear to determine outcomes, the race of the victim in capital crimes does as well:
according to FBI statistics, approximately 51% of murder victims are white3, yet 82% of death
row inmates were sentenced to death for murders involving white victims4. Looking at the
United States penal system more broadly, black people make up 38.6% of the prison population,
while white people make up 57.6% of that population5. Although this statistic shows a lower
degree of disproportionality than the above statistic about the race of death row inmates, the total
prison population is far greater than the death row population, so the statistic about the racial
disparity in the prison population as a whole is more robust evidence of disparate outcomes in
the criminal justice system. However, as Jennifer Eberhardt points out in the book Biased:
Uncovering the Hidden Prejudice that Shapes What We See, Think, and Do, disparate outcomes
in the criminal justice system do not necessarily point to biased decision-making or unfair
procedures; rather, the criminal justice system may be unbiased and disparate outcomes may
simply be evidence that black people commit more crimes, including capital crimes, than white
people do6. Further empirical evidence, however, makes it more plausible to conclude that the
criminal justice system produces outcomes in a racially biased manner than it is to conclude that
white and black people have disparate rates of criminal behavior: as of 2015, 95% of elected
prosecutors were white and 14 states did not have any non-white elected prosecutors7. Similar
7 “Study: Most States Have No Black Prosecutors,” The Atlantic, July 7, 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/american-prosecutors-are-incredible-whitedoes-it-matter/3978
47/.
6 In Biased, Eberhardt focuses on racial bias within police activity, rather than focusing on racially disparate
outcomes within sentencing and incarceration, but her point, that the presence or absence of racial bias in the
criminal justice system is underdetermined by disparate outcomes, applies equally to either focus.
5 “Inmate Race,” Bureau of Prisons, October 24, 2020,
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp.
4 “Race and the Death Penalty,” American Civil Liberties Union,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/aclu_dp_factsheet4.pdf.
3 “2018: Crime in the United States,” Federal Bureau of Investigations,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-6.xls.
2 “Racial Demographics,” https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview/demographics.
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racial disparities hold among the judiciary, where, as of the summer of 2019, 23 state supreme
courts were entirely white8, and where only 27% of U.S. District Court and Court of Appeals
judges are non-white9. In addition, as of late 2019, federal judges were four times as likely to be
former prosecutors than they were to be former criminal defense lawyers10. Beyond simply
representing demographic disparities, prosecutors and judges tend to apply their discretion in a
racially disparate manner: studies show that prosecutors charge black people for crimes which
carry mandatory minimum sentences or enhanced sentences for repeat offenders at a higher rate
than they charge white people under those statutes, even adjusting for the nature of the offense11.
Although I have presented evidence that the criminal justice system produces racially
disparate outcomes and that this disparity is the result of bias within the system, I have not yet
presented evidence which bears on whether the bias in the criminal justice system is implicit or
explicit. Jennifer Eberhardt, in the aforementioned book Biased, asserts that the bias in the
criminal justice system is largely implicit; Eberhardt asserts that humans’ tendency to
unconsciously rely on preconceived stereotypes, combined with this country’s history of racial
injustices, results in a population of people who, despite mostly holding no explicitly racist
beliefs, tend to treat people of different races differently. Under Eberhardt’s view, implicit racial
bias influences the criminal justice system because actors in the criminal justice system come
11 “Report to the United Nations on Racial Disparities in the U.S. Criminal Justice System,” Sentencing Project,
April 19, 2018, https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/.
10 “There Are Way Too Many Prosecutors in the Federal Judiciary,” Slate, October 14, 2019,
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/10/too-many-prosecutors-federal-judiciary.html. - One could argue that
former prosecutors are not actually overrepresented on the federal bench, because there are more prosecutors than
there are public defenders and private criminal defense lawyers, but it is nevertheless true that federal judges are far
more likely to come from a career of advocating for the government, rather than for defendants, in criminal cases.








from a society in which this bias is unnoticed but ever present. Eberhardt acknowledges that
implicit racial bias is not monolithic across all members of our society, because, for example,
police officers are disproportionately exposed to people committing crimes or being perceived to
commit crimes, and these experiences are filtered through the officers’ existing implicit bias,
molding and reinforcing that bias.
The same logic can be applied to prosecutors and judges, because prosecutors choose
people to charge from among those detained by law enforcement officers, whose
above-described implicit bias shapes the group of people they detain, which reinforces
prosecutors’ implicit associations between people of color and criminality. These implicit
associations held by prosecutors result in disparate patterns of charging, plea bargain negotiation,
proposed sentences, etc., which disparities in turn mold the implicit biases of judges, whose
courtrooms are disproportionately full of black defendants.
While I give credence to Eberhardt’s evidence about the psychology of implicit bias and I
believe that such bias plays a large role in producing the racially disparate outcomes of the
criminal justice system, I believe that explicit bias plays a significant role as well. This is to say,
I believe that some prosecutors and judges allow their decision-making to be influenced by
explicitly-held racist beliefs and, relatedly, that some such actors use their roles in the justice
system as tools to maintain racial hierarchies which already exist in our society. As evidence, I
will present examples of prosecutorial discretion, as well as an individual criminal case, which
serve as evidence of the effects of explicit bias within the criminal justice system.
In the book Usual Cruelty: The Complicity of Lawyers in the Criminal Injustice System,
Alec Karakatsanis writes, “the post-arrest criminal system is not ‘law enforcement,’ but a
bureaucracy designed and permitted to circumvent the ‘rule of law’ when necessary to pursue the
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aims that political elites have assigned to it” (Karakatsanis, 36). Included in the “aims that
political elites have assigned to [the law],” Karakatsanis asserts, is the subjugation and repression
of non-white people. This does not mean, however, that political elites, such as legislators,
governors, presidents, and attorneys general have autonomously decided to promote white
supremacy and instructed their subordinates to act accordingly. Rather, these political actors exist
within a kind of “feedback loop” with the public and with lower-level government officials: the
public and lower-level government officials (including, for example, police and correctional
officers’ unions) express their racial bias in the way that they vote, which causes the political
actors in power to take racially biased actions. These actions in turn appear to confirm the
racially biased attitudes already held by the public and by lower-level government officials,
which continues the cycle. As an example of this feedback loop in action, public anti-black
sentiment surrounding the use of drugs may influence policy-makers to raise the mandatory
minimum sentence attached to the possession of drugs more commonly used by black people
than by white people, which confirms, in the minds of voters and lower-level officials, that black
people engage in more destructive and criminal behavior than white people do, which leads to
more anti-black sentiment affecting policy-makers.
The results of this feedback loop are evidenced both by the results of the criminal justice
system, which include the aforementioned imprisonment of non-white people at a rate vastly
disproportionate to their share of the population, and by the decisions made in the
implementation of criminal procedure: as Karakatsanis emphasizes, when certain elements of the
law are unclear or conflict with each other, judges, prosecutors, and other parties in the criminal
justice system tend to enforce those elements of the law in the way which best advances the
aforementioned political aims of the law. Karakatsanis, using the example of the Philadelphia
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Row bombing of 1985, points to prosecutorial discretion as one way in which the indeterminacy
of the law is used to advance racist political aims: in May of 1985, Philadelphia police dropped
bombs provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) on the houses of black liberation
activists. Public officials then instructed the fire department not to put out the resulting fire, and
police shot at surviving activists as they fled the burning homes. As Karakatsanis points out,
“exercising their discretion, local and federal prosecutors chose not to prosecute any of the
people who carried out or ordered the bombing. But they did exercise their discretion to
prosecute the only adult black liberation activist who survived” (Karakatsanis, 43). Implicit in
the foregoing quote is the statement that prosecutors did not decide whom to prosecute and
whom to abstain from prosecuting based on any neutral calculus of harm caused, evidentiary
standards, or the like, but that prosecutors instead made their decisions in such a way as to
advance the anti-black aims of the political environment. The Philadelphia Row bombing is
simply one striking example in a larger pattern, as Karakatsanis claims; the FBI’s
Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which ran from 1956 until the early 1980s,
consisted of the systemic infiltration of leftist and pro-civil rights groups and the persecution of
the members thereof. In service of COINTELPRO, FBI agents performed illegal surveillance,
made threats of violence, and even kidnapped and murdered people, but when the Program was
finally exposed, no FBI agents were prosecuted for their crimes12. Given the substantial evidence
that serious crimes were committed on a large scale, it is difficult to explain this prosecutorial
decision in racially or politically neutral terms.
To give a more recent example, Rodney Reed, a black man, has been on death row in
Texas for 23 years for the murder and rape of Stacey Stites, a white woman with whom Reed had
been having an affair, even though there are numerous substantive and procedural problems with
12 Karakatsanis, Alec, Usual Cruelty: The Complicity of Lawyers in the Criminal Injustice System, 2019.
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his conviction: the forensics experts whose testimony was central to the case against Reed have
since admitted that their conclusions were in error, and outside forensics experts have confirmed
the falsity of the original forensic testimony offered. In addition, a detective conducting the
investigation indicated on tape shortly after Stites was murdered that he and the other police
investigating believed Stites’ fiance, Jimmy Fennell, to be Stites’ killer. This belief was
supported by the fact that Fennell gave inconsistent reports about where he was at the time the
murder was committed, that Fennell, a white police officer, had previously been convicted of
sexually assaulting women in his custody, and that Stites was having an affair with Reed, the
discovery of which would have given Fennell a motive to kill her. Nevertheless, Reed, not
Fennell, was prosecuted for Stites’ murder, and Reed’s conviction has never been overturned, nor
have any criminal charges been filed against Fennell, despite the aforementioned exculpatory
facts, in addition to the fact that DNA matching one of Fennell’s colleagues in the police force
was found on a beer can at the site where Stites’ body was found, the fact that the prosecution
withheld the aforementioned DNA results from Reed’s defense lawyer13, the fact that the murder
weapon has never been tested for DNA, and the fact that per a sworn affidavit signed by an
inmate who met Fennell during a recent prison stay, Fennell admitted to Stites’ murder14. Despite
the quantity of substantive reasons why it appears that Reed is innocent, as well as the quantity
of procedural reasons why Reed’s conviction was invalid, the Texas Supreme Court only ruled to
halt Reed’s execution 5 days before the execution was scheduled, even though the
aforementioned evidence of problems with Reed’s conviction had existed and been presented by
Reed’s defense lawyers years earlier.
14 “Ten Facts about Rodney Reed’s Case You Need to Know,” Innocence Project, 2019.
https://www.innocenceproject.org/10-facts-you-need-to-know-about-rodney-reed-who-is-scheduled-for-execution-o
n-november-20/.
13 “Rodney Reed’s Appeals: Key Players,” The Austin Chronicle, 2019.
https://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2019-11-15/rodney-reeds-appeals-key-players/.
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Reed’s case supports my claim about racially-motivated decision-making on the part of
prosecutors and judges because the trajectory of the case has not been determined by an
individual instance of police misconduct, faulty testimony, or the like; rather, the trajectory of the
case, from the original trial through the ongoing appeals process, has been determined by
countless instances of prosecutorial discretion and judicial review. It seems near impossible to
understand how all of these instances of decision-making have resulted in such a clear
miscarriage of justice without making reference to the underlying fact that Reed was a black man
known to be having an affair with a white woman. As I acknowledge above, I do not have
sufficient empirical knowledge to make specific statistical claims about the likelihood of racial
bias impacting a given case or about the percent of prosecutors and judges who allow racial bias
to impact their decisions, but I believe that the evidence and arguments just presented are
sufficient to support the empirical claim that racial bias frequently plays a non-trivial role in the
decision-making of prosecutors and judges.
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Chapter 1: The Moral Duty to Effect Substantive Justice
In this section, I will argue that individual judges and prosecutors have a moral duty to
use their offices within the criminal justice system to promote the greatest substantive justice
possible in each case, even when doing so would require the individual to go against precedent,
positive law, stated prosecutorial priorities, etc.
Chapter 1.1: The Fugitive Slave Act
By the nature of their offices, individual prosecutors and judges have significant power to
mold outcomes within the criminal justice system, which invites the question of whether these
individuals can use their power to bring about the most just outcomes in each case, even if doing
so would require role infidelity of the type described above. A prominent historical example in
which judges wrestled with this question occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, when northern
judges, many of whom were personally abolitionist, heard cases involving the Fugitive Slave
Acts (FSAs). The FSAs were a series of laws, stemming from the “Bloody Clause” of the
Constitution, which mandated that slaves could not achieve legal freeperson status by escaping to
the North, and, relatedly, that the owners of escaped slaves could recapture those individuals
within northern states and transport them back to captivity in the South. I will examine this
example in detail, because it illustrates the contours of role fidelity and the context of the moral
duties on judges.
As Robert Cover describes in the book Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial
Process, whereas before the implementation of the FSAs, personally abolitionist judges had been
able to interpret the relevant statutes in favorem libertatis (“in favor of liberty”), using gaps or
vagueness within the positive law and appeals to the libertarian principles enshrined elsewhere in
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the law to decide in favor of the escaped slaves, the clarity of the FSAs prevented this method of
interpretation and brought the question of role fidelity versus infidelity into relief. Judges in
these cases tended to abide by the FSAs and rule in favor of the slave owners or the agents hired
by the slave owners to recapture the escaped slaves, and tended to write in their opinions
defending these rulings that they could not rule otherwise, because the positive law was binding
and outcome-determinative. Cover writes that these opinions reflected a misunderstanding, on
the part of the judges, of the position held by their critics and ideological opponents (namely, the
escaped slaves’ legal advocates): the judges’ critics did not hold that the judges had
misunderstood the FSAs and their relation to the judges’ official role; rather, the judges’ critics
held that even assuming that the judges’ official role would entail deciding in favor of the slave
owners, the judges should have decided in favor of the escaped slaves. The key conceptual
distinction is that the judges were treating the FSAs as mechanistically determinative of a
specific outcome, which condition would preempt the ability to decide whether to obey the FSAs
or not, while the judges’ critics were pointing out that the FSAs were only determinative of the
outcome which would fall within a judge’s official role, so a judge did, in fact, have the ability to
decide whether the moral weight of anti-slavery was greater or lesser than the moral weight of
role fidelity. Cover rephrases this distinction by writing, “the formal restraints [of the judge’s
role] are under challenge and cannot be justified by mere reiteration” (Cover, 129).
Cover sheds further light on the nature of the judicial role and fidelity thereto using two
analogies: the first analogy compares the judicial role to a game of chess; if a chess player were
to move their bishop straight and agree with their opponent that such a move was valid, the two
people would no longer be playing chess, because one of the essential properties of chess is that
the bishops can only move diagonally. A player could, however, move their bishop straight and
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hope that their opponent did not notice, under which circumstance the two people would still be
playing chess, but one of the players would simply be cheating. Under this analogy, judges who
wrote that they could not rule in favor of the escaped slaves meant that their roles were defined
by implementing the positive law, so by disregarding the FSAs, they would simply no longer
have been acting as judges. Conversely, under the same analogy, the judges’ critics were urging
the judges to “cheat” and rule in favor of the escaped slaves even though to do so would have
been to “break the rules” of the judicial role. The second analogy compares the judicial role to
that of a person speaking a language; someone who breaks the existing rules of a language is still
speaking that language, and while they may be speaking it poorly, they may instead be speaking
it eloquently and contributing to a change in the language. Under this analogy, a judge who ruled
in favor of an escaped slave in an FSA case would still be acting as a judge, although people
could debate whether the judge was “speaking law poorly,” by violating the established rules of
their role, or “speaking law eloquently,” by changing the nature of the judicial role so that it
included the consideration of morality15. I believe that the language analogy is a more apt
characterization of the judicial role than is the chess game analogy, because while the rules of
chess are clearcut and a chess player only has discretion in choosing which moves to make
within these rules, the rules of the judicial role are less clearly defined and the nature of judicial
decision-making can change over time, depending on the practices of actual judges. The same
analogy applies to prosecutors, and easily so, because prosecutorial discretion is not typically
considered to be clause-bound in the way that judicial decision-making is considered to be.
Applying Cover’s language analogy to the context of modern judges and prosecutors, if
those individuals promote the greatest possible substantive justice in each case, they may shape
the nature of their respective roles, so that future judges and prosecutors would simply be hewing
15 Cover, Robert, “The Judicial ‘Can’t,’” Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process, 1975, p. 123-130.
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to the norm by promoting substantive justice, in much the same way that the first person who
said “ain’t” must have been considered a linguistic rule-breaker, but now the use of “ain’t” is a
widely-accepted and useful part of the English language. Of course, the fact that judges and
prosecutors could change the norms of their respective roles does not prove anything without an
argument that those norms should in fact be changed; that is to say, the foregoing argument
would only have force if combined with an argument showing that it is desirable for judges and
prosecutors to promote substantive justice. I will now offer such an argument.
Chapter 1.2: In Defense of Role Infidelity
Thus far, I have referred several times to judges’ and prosecutors’ moral duties to effect
substantive justice in each case, but “duties” is admittedly not the most accurate term for what I
am asserting; there is a difference between the weaker claim that a judge or prosecutor has a
moral right to promote the maximum substantive justice each case, even at the cost of engaging
in role infidelity, and the stronger claim that such an individual has a moral obligation, mutatis
mutandis. My position is that each judge and prosecutor, at a minimum, has a moral right to
engage in role infidelity if necessary to promote substantive justice in a given case, but that
whether each judge and prosecutor has a moral obligation to do so will depend on how much
substantive justice is at stake in a given case16.
It is easy to argue that, ceteris paribus, a person should take actions which accord with
justice, but the difficulty for my position comes from the fact that when considering a judge or
prosecutor, all things are not equal; judges and prosecutors agree to execute the duties of their
16 Whether a judge or prosecutor in a given case has a moral obligation to effect substantive justice, if that were to
require role infidelity, would also depend on the likely practical consequences of engaging in role infidelity in that
case. However, as I will dedicate a later section of this thesis to the moral and practical value of role fidelity, I will
not address it here.
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respective offices (in most cases, they take formal oaths of office) and their offices play specific
roles within the criminal justice system. Arguably, each judge and prosecutor only possesses the
above-described power to affect outcomes in virtue of their having accepted a moral obligation
to remain faithful to their role. True as this may be, I believe that the moral importance of
effecting substantive justice outweighs any moral obligation of role fidelity. One could retort that
the moral obligation of role fidelity is a Kantian categorical imperative or something similar, and
that it therefore preempts or nullifies any countervailing moral or practical considerations. I
would respond to this point by appealing to Lysander Spooner, who advocated for judges in FSA
cases to rule in favor of escaped slaves by arguing that insofar as the judicial oath of office
bound judges to facilitate the moral ill of slavery, that oath was invalid and therefore could not
exert moral force on judges.
In his 1860 work The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, Spooner uses the analogy of a
person, B, who is offered a sword by A on the condition that they swear to use the sword to kill
someone. Spooner asserts that the person offered the sword should accept it, even though they
are agreeing to commit a murder, and then use the sword to defend the person whom they had
sworn to kill. It would not only be acceptable but morally commendable for the person offered
the sword to break their oath in this way, asserts Spooner, because the immoral character of the
oath’s contents renders the oath “incapable of raising the least moral obligation, of any kind
whatever, on the part of B towards A.” Spooner continues, “B then holds the sword on the same
principle, and by the same right, that he would have done if it had been put into his hands
without any oath or condition whatever” (Spooner, 150-151). Applying this analogy to judges, as
Spooner did, and to prosecutors, insofar as fidelity to their respective roles would require them to
perpetuate moral ills, their moral obligation of role fidelity is nullified and they are left in the
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position of a person who had their power without any of the parameters of role fidelity. As I state
above, it is easy to argue that someone without the restraints of role fidelity or other restraints
should take actions which accord with justice, so under Spooner’s argument, it is clear that
prosecutors and judges ought to promote substantive justice in each case.
Spooner’s analogy, however, relies on the argument that the Constitution inherently binds
judges to commit immorality, because it binds judges to uphold the Bloody Clause and to uphold
any duly-enacted pro-slavery laws (assuming that those laws do not contradict other enumerated
Constitutional principles). However, my argument holds that the substantive injustice perpetrated
by the criminal justice system does not lie in the inherent properties of the Constitution, but in
the ways in which criminal procedure is applied, so my argument is substantially disanalogous
with Spooner’s example of the person accepting the sword. Nevertheless, to the extent that racial
bias affects decision-making within the legal system, judges’ and prosecutors’ moral obligation
of role fidelity is an obligation to uphold a system which perpetuates racism. The mere existence
of racial bias within the criminal justice system as a whole, however, is not sufficient reason to
consider a judge or prosecutor’s obligation of role fidelity an obligation to facilitate racism, but if
a judge or prosecutor has reason to believe that a case in which they are involved is tainted by
racial bias, it is more clear how maintaining role fidelity would be tantamount to facilitating
racism. If, for example, a prosecutor has a pattern of charging black defendants under mandatory
minimum statutes at a rate disproportional to the rate at which they charge white defendants
under those statutes, a judge who maintained impartiality and simply let the jury decide each
defendant’s guilt or innocence would be allowing the prosecutor’s racially biased use of
discretion to translate into racially biased outcomes. The judge’s office would function as a
“sword,” applying Spooner’s analogy, with which the judge is able to defend the black
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defendants from the prosecutor’s biased use of discretion. Given that the boundaries of the
judge’s role, in this example, would entail hearing cases brought before them due to racially
biased prosecutorial discretion and, if the jury returned a verdict of “guilty,” imposing sentences
on defendants who are disproportionately black, the boundaries of the judge’s role would thus be
sapped of moral weight and the judge would have the “sword” of their office “by the same right
that [they] would have done if it had been put into [their] hands without any oath or condition
whatever” (Spooner, 150-151). Therefore, the judge would have the moral right, if not the
obligation, to act so as to counteract the racial bias of the prosecutor and strive to achieve the
most substantively just outcome possible (for example, by rendering a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, if the jury were to convict, on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that
the defendant’s conduct fit within the parameters to which the mandatory minimum statute
applies).
Although naturalists and positivists differ in their beliefs about whether justice is an
essential characteristic of the law, legal theorists from both camps can agree that the natural aim
of the law is to promote justice. The law, in the United States, is created and enforced through a
set of processes each of whose aims may not be the promotion of justice - for example, allowing
the citizens to vote for legislators serves the aim of promoting democratic representation and
having executive and judicial branches serves the aim of preserving checks on legislative power -
but the overarching purpose which those processes serve must be the promotion of justice, or
else there would be no reason for those processes to exist. The roles of judges and prosecutors,
therefore, exist in order to serve the aim of promoting justice. It is obvious that when such an
actor in the legal system executes the duties of their office in a racially biased manner, that actor
is perpetrating an injustice. Less obvious, although, I believe, equally true, is that if a judge or
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prosecutor steps outside the bounds of their role in order to counteract racial bias, they are
promoting justice. Therefore, paradoxical as it may be, by violating role fidelity in order to
promote justice, a judge or prosecutor would actually be completing their role, insofar as the
judge’s or prosecutor’s role exists in order to promote justice. At this point, one could object that
even though judges’ and prosecutors’ roles exist in order to serve justice, their roles are
specifically tailored to fit within a larger legislative and judicial system which serves justice, so
individual judges and prosecutors must operate within those circumscribed roles, rather than
acting as the “platonic guardians” of the entire criminal justice system and acting however they
see fit. I would respond that the influence of racial bias on a given case or statute changes this
picture, so that judges and prosecutors should, in fact, step outside of their roles and strive to
promote justice. This is the case because the roles of judges and prosecutors only contribute to
the effectuation of justice if they are applied in a context which is free of racial bias. As I argue
above, if a judge were to operate within the bounds of their role when the prosecutor was acting
in a racially biased manner, the judge would be allowing the prosecutor’s biased actions to
translate into biased outcomes, which would constitute an injustice.
Chapter 1.3: The Dworkinian New Naturalist Objection
One could object to this argument on the grounds that I am assuming a positivist legal
philosophy, which allows me to draw a distinction between role fidelity and following one’s
conscience which I would not be able to draw if I instead assumed a Dworkinian new naturalist
legal philosophy; under positivism, the role of a judge is limited to enforcing enumerated
constitutional rights and duly-enacted statutes, so if a judge were to decide a case based on the
morality of the relevant statute, the judge would be violating role fidelity. Under Dworkin’s view,
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however, in enforcing enumerated constitutional rights and duly-enacted statutes, a judge ought
to balance the “dimension[s] of fit [and of] justification.” The dimension of fit is the extent to
which a given outcome in a case would preserve the “holistic integrity” of the law, both in terms
of maintaining consistency with precedent and in terms of allowing future judges to maintain
consistency by relying on the current case as precedent. The dimension of justification is the
moral status of the right or statute being considered, and, accordingly, a judge’s consideration of
the dimension of justification includes the consideration of the moral status of each possible
outcome in a given case. Regardless of whether the dimensions of fit and of justification coincide
or conflict in a given case, they are not completely distinct concepts, because the principles of
political morality which inform the dimension of justification may be drawn from an analysis of
the body of positive law and precedent, which analysis would be part of the dimension of fit17. To
use an example which Dworkin himself elaborated, a judge in an FSA case who was trying to
maintain the dimension of fit would have to consider the facts that the Constitution includes
robust protections of individuals’ freedom and that the Constitution lays out a form of federalism
broadly inconsistent with the FSAs18. For a Dworkinian theorist, a judge who looked further
afield than a narrow interpretation of the positive law would not be stepping outside of their role,
but fulfilling their role thoroughly. Thus, the objector would continue, I have created a conflict
between maintaining role fidelity and following one’s conscience, but the real conflict is simply
between positivism and Dworkinian new naturalism.
I will respond to this objection with two arguments, the first of which is narrowly focused
on the differences between my view and Dworkin’s and the second of which is more broad and
conceptual. The first argument is that the view which I propose in this paper gives substantive
18 Dworkin, Ronald, “The Law of the Slave-Catchers,” Times Literary Supplement, December 5, 1975.
17 Dworkin, Ronald, Law’s Empire, 1986.
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justice a significantly greater role than does Dworkin’s view, so my view cannot be reduced to a
rejection of positivism and an endorsement of Dworkinian naturalism. Under Dworkin’s view,
most of the time that judges must apply discretion to decide difficult cases, they are applying
weak discretion, meaning that they are not acting as “deputy legislators,” to use H.L.A. Hart’s
phrase, and applying their own, extra-legal opinions about the case. Rather, judges applying
weak discretion are using the dimensions of fit and of justification to discern the principles and
policies which are relevant to the case and to figure out which outcome the principles and
policies suggest. Principles, which exist in order to protect minority rights, and policies, which
exist in order to promote the well-being of the majority, may be extra-statutory, but, in contrast
with Hart’s view, they are not extra-legal; under Dworkin’s view, the unwritten principles and
policies which undergird the positive law are themselves binding elements of the law.
Whereas my view holds that a judge must sometimes decide cases according to their own
understanding of the moral values at stake, Dworkin’s view holds that in most difficult cases, a
judge must decide according to preexisting principles and policies whose characteristics are not
swayed by the judge’s personal moral beliefs. Admittedly, the dimension of justification
recommends that a judge not only consider which outcome allows the case to best cohere with
the existing body of precedent, statutes, and rights, but also consider which outcome would lend
the most morally justifiable trajectory to the coherent body of precedent. Accordingly, Dworkin
described a judge in a difficult case as analogous to a writer tasked with writing one chapter of a
“chain novel,” a novel in which all of the previous chapters have been written by different people
and all of the future chapters will be written by different people. When considering what to write
in their chapter, a writer would have to consider what content would make the most sense to
follow the previous chapters and to allow the future writers to continue the novel in a coherent
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manner, but the writer would also have to consider what content would make the novel as a
whole the best it could be. Following this analogy, Dworkin holds that a judge should decide a
difficult case in a way that allows the “chain novel” of the law to follow a consistent “storyline,”
while also trying to make the “storyline” which the law follows as morally justifiable as possible.
In Dworkin’s view of a judge as temporary author of the legal “chain novel,” a judge’s role is
largely bound to the interpretation of the positive law, even though this interpretation allows the
judge some liberty to consider extra-statutory factors, including moral factors. By contrast, under
my view, a judge must consider the moral values relevant to each case and, if necessary, entirely
set aside positivist interpretation in order to achieve the most morally justifiable outcome.
To illustrate this difference between Dworkin’s view and mine, I will return to Dworkin’s
writing about the FSA cases: in “the Law of the Slave-Catchers,” which is a commentary on
Cover’s above-cited Justice Accused, Dworkin writes that judges in those cases “suffered not
from too much formalism, but from too little” (Dworkin, 179). Although there are elements of
certain FSA cases, such as the violation of the escaped slaves’ Sixth and Seventh Amendment
rights and the violation of Article III of the Constitution, which would allow a judge to rule in
favor of the slave on purely formal, procedural grounds, Dworkin takes a different approach in
this paper; he asserts that the principle of liberty is enshrined in the Constitution and that the
Constitution lays out a form of federalism under which the FSAs could not prevent free states
from setting their own laws to protect the freedom of escaped slaves. Dworkin holds that these
two principles, of liberty and of limited federal authority, combined with the aforementioned
procedural problems with FSA cases, were “more central to the law than were the particular and
transitory policies of the slavery compromise” (Dworkin, 180). Dworkin’s judicial philosophy
does not give enough weight to the consideration of morality, because he must contort his
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judicial philosophy in order to argue that the judges in the FSA cases should have ruled in favor
of the escaped slaves (and thus ruled in favor of the most morally justifiable outcome); what
Dworkin refers to as “particular and transitory policies” were duly-enacted statutes which put
into effect Article IV Section 2 of the Constitution, the so-called “Bloody Clause.” In addition,
by the time of the well-known FSA cases of the 1850s, there was already a body of precedent in
which judges in similar cases had decided those cases in favorem libertatis, but only to the extent
that the ambiguity and gaps in the positive law allowed. To the extent that the positive law was
clear, judges in previous cases had tended to respect it, even when it contradicted their personal
moral beliefs, so the FSAs not only had a “pedigree” of validity within the positive law (to use
Hart’s term), they also had some amount of precedential support19. In order to rule in favor of an
escaped slave, a judge would have had to place far more weight on the dimension of justification
than on the dimension of fit, because a judge would have had to value the principles of liberty
and limited federal authority highly enough that these principles could justify disrupting the
coherence of the law and invalidating an unambiguous clause of the Constitution. In skewing so
far toward the dimension of justification, a judge would have had to place great value in their
personal, anti-slavery moral beliefs.
Taking Dworkin’s stance on the FSA cases a step further, if the constitutional principle of
liberty and the immorality of slavery played a large role in justifying the invalidation of the
Bloody Clause and the FSAs, those two elements should also have rendered the entire institution
of slavery legally invalid. Therefore, in order to justify the outcome which he believes was
correct in the FSA cases, Dworkin has to give the consideration of morality a larger role than his
judicial philosophy suggests, a role so large that it would have encouraged judges to act as
19 Cover, Robert, “Statutory Interpretation: In Favorem Libertatis?”, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial
Process, 1975, p. 62-79.
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deputy legislators (or even deputy Framers) and abolish slavery. Dworkin’s stance on the FSA
cases lends a primacy to substantive justice which is inconsistent with his general view but
perfectly consistent with mine. Dworkin’s writing about the FSA cases not only shows the
significant differences between his view and mine, it shows that when considering a situation in
which fundamental moral values are at stake, Dworkin adopts a view similar to mine.
My second response to the objection that the real conflict is between Dworkin’s
naturalism and positivism, not between maintaining role fidelity and following one’s conscience,
is that both Dworkin’s naturalism and positivism are ideal theories of law, whereas my stance is
founded on legal realism and critical race theory (CRT), both of which reject (and respond to)
ideal theories of law. As I describe above, Dworkin’s naturalist view differs from positivism by
including some amount of moral consideration as internal to the judicial role, rather than
classifying moral consideration as an external factor which may draw a judge outside of the
boundaries of their role. Given, however, that my view is rooted in the legal realist claim that one
should examine which factors actually influence judicial decision-making, rather than debating
the ideal characteristics of the judicial role, the question of whether the consideration of morality
is internal or external to the judicial role is trivial; if there is a certain amount of racial bias which
in fact influences outcomes within the criminal justice system, the moral duties of a judge should
not change based on whether the judge’s role “really does” or “really does not” include the
consideration of morality.
Chapter 1.4: Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory
An objector could retort that while my view hinges on rejecting the ideal theories offered
by Dworkin, Hart, etc. and responding using the realist theories offered by Holmes, Llewelyn,
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and critical race theorists, my view is itself an ideal theory, because it holds that given the
influence of racial bias on the criminal justice system, it would be ideal for judges and
prosecutors to consider their own moral beliefs in deciding cases. Therefore, the objector could
continue, both Dworkin’s naturalism and CRT offer idealized conceptions of the judicial role, so
the only relevant difference between the two theories is in which aspects of the idealized judicial
role each one emphasizes (Dworkin’s naturalism emphasizes the balancing of positive statutes,
precedent, principles, and policies, while CRT emphasizes anti-racism). By way of analogy, the
objector could continue, John Rawls conceives of justice as centered around fair equality of
opportunity (FEO), which conception Tommie Shelby employs in developing an anti-racist
theory. Charles Mills, however, labels Rawls’ conception of justice and Shelby’s subsequent
anti-racist theory as instances of ideal theory, and critiques them on the grounds that non-ideal
theory is necessary in order to develop a method by which to promote justice (especially racial
justice) in American society. In the paper “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: a Reply to
Charles Mills,” Shelby defends his theory, as well as Rawls’ conception of justice, by arguing
that the non-ideal approach to achieving justice which Mills recommends would need to rely on
ideal theory. Shelby summarizes this argument as follows: “if we abandon the framework for
ideal theorizing, how do we determine which principles of justice should guide our reform or
revolutionary efforts, and how do we justify these principles if we must rely exclusively on
nonideal theory?” (Shelby, 156).
Although the debate between Shelby and Mills concerns the methods of working toward
justice in general, which is far more broad than the topic of this thesis, Shelby and Mills’ debate
is relevant to this thesis, because it seems that without the background of an ideal theory of
judicial and prosecutorial decision-making, the arguments which I advance in this thesis would
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be trivial; without the body of ideal legal theory which assumes that the law is applied in a
racially unbiased manner, I would have to create a theory of judicial and prosecutorial
decision-making “from scratch,” as would other legal realists and critical race theorists, but
given that we have not tended to create such theories “from scratch,” it is clear that ideal theory
is part of the foundation of our non-ideal theories. Due to this point, I have to side with Shelby
over Mills, because Shelby is right that Mills has to presuppose certain elements of ideal theory,
namely a liberal conception of justice which strives to promote fair equality of opportunity, in
order to meaningfully engage in non-ideal theorizing with the goal of achieving racial justice.
The question remains, however, of what ideal theory I am taking as foundational to this thesis;
while I laid out certain general metaethical and substantive moral presuppositions earlier in the
thesis, I have not enumerated the features of a racially just legal system or of a racially just
society which the non-ideal theory presented here aims to advance. While I will delve into this
question later in the thesis, I can state for now that the ideal theory on which my argument rests
is based on the liberal idea that one’s race should not affect their life prospects. Returning to the
Shelby-Mills debate, Shelby writes that although Rawlsian ideal theorizing assumes perfect
compliance on the part of those charged with implementing any anti-racist program, this is
simply a methodological choice and does not ignore the fact that individuals are not actually
perfectly compliant with rules20. My view differs from Shelby’s on this point, because whatever
the contours of the ideal theory on which this thesis is grounded, that theory must account for
some degree of non-compliance in order to plausibly apply to the real world.
Chapter 1.5: The “Insurgency” Objection
20 Shelby, Tommie, “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills,” 2013, p. 150.
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Returning to the content of the non-ideal theory which I advance in this thesis, thus far, I
have described the moral situation of judges and prosecutors once they have already assumed
their offices, but the expectations about the legal system which these actors have before
assuming their offices may be morally relevant as well; a judge or prosecutor may assume their
office under the assumption that the criminal justice system tends to produce substantively just
outcomes or they may assume their office with the knowledge that racial bias often plays a
significant role in determining outcomes in the criminal justice system. Based on this distinction,
one could object to my argument by asserting that if a legal actor takes their office under the
former assumption and then decides to pursue substantive justice at the cost of role fidelity, they
are simply siding with their conscience, while if a legal actor takes their office under the latter
assumption, they are acting as an “insurgent,” to use Cover’s term. “Insurgent” is an accurate
description of such a person, the objection would hold, because they would accept a job in the
criminal justice system and take the oath of office, all the while planning to undermine the
system by trespassing the boundaries of their role whenever they see fit.
I would respond to this objection by drawing a distinction between intention and
expectation: if a judge or prosecutor were to take the oath of their office with the intention of
disregarding the boundaries of their role, the above objection would hold, because they would be
seeking a position of power so that they could abuse it. If, however, a judge or prosecutor were to
take the oath of their office not intending to disregard the boundaries of their role but expecting
that there would be future cases in which justice would compel them to do so, the above
objection would not hold, because the actor would have no intention to gain power in order to
abuse it; rather, the actor would simply have an understanding of the system in which they plan
to work and a willingness to side with their conscience over their role, when necessary. The
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imagined objector could further object by rejecting the distinction between intention and
expectation, asserting that one who reasonably expects to perform a certain action is no
differently morally situated than someone who intends to perform that action. Therefore, the
objection would hold, the person who swears the oath of their office with the expectation that
there will be cases in which the pursuit of justice will lead them to step outside the boundaries of
their role is morally no different from the person who takes the oath of their office with the
intention of stepping outside the boundaries of their role. I would respond that the distinction
between intention and expectation is a morally sound one, which one can observe by examining
the same distinction in other situations.
The distinction between the moral value of intended and expected outcomes stems from
the doctrine of double effect, which holds that it may be morally permissible to take a certain
action while intending a good outcome and foreseeing an accompanying bad outcome, but it is
impermissible to take the same action while intending the bad outcome and foreseeing the good
outcome. To provide an oft-used example, it would be wrong for a doctor to give a suffering
patient a lethal dose of morphine, intending to kill the patient and foreseeing that once dead, the
patient will no longer be in pain. However, it would be acceptable (or at least less unacceptable)
for the doctor to give the patient a lethal dose of morphine, intending to alleviate the patient’s
pain and foreseeing that the morphine will kill the patient.21 The objector could accept the
doctrine of double effect but assert that it does not apply to my example of judges and
prosecutors, because while the doctrine of double effect distinguishes between intended and
merely expected outcomes of actions, my example attempts to distinguish between an individual
21 “Doctrine of Double Effect,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, December 24, 2018,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/.
The doctrine of double effect comes from Catholic philosophy and is often used in discussions of whether such
actions as abortion and euthanasia accord with Catholic ethics, but it can be applied just as easily to secular
philosophy, in which context I am using it.
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intending and merely expecting to perform an action themself. Whereas one can avoid the moral
onus of a merely expected bad outcome, the objector would continue, one must take full moral
responsibility for any actions which one expects to perform themself. I would respond that, as
this thesis contends, the action of violating role fidelity is not itself bad; rather, it is the course of
action consisting of deliberately joining the criminal justice system in order to operate as an
“insurgent” and violate role fidelity which is bad. The doctrine of double effect helps distinguish
between this bad course of action and the acceptable course of action taken by a person who
foresees sometimes being conscience-bound to violate role fidelity, but does not join the criminal
justice system with the intention to do so. If the objector considers the above description and
example of the doctrine of double effect and simply rejects it, the objection still does not
necessarily succeed, because even if a judge or prosecutor truly is an “insurgent,” they are not
necessarily acting wrongly.
In some cases, an act of outright “insurgency” performed by an official may be
acceptable or even laudable. If, for example, an individual in Nazi Germany were to become an
SS officer with the specific purpose of undermining the SS whenever possible, they would have
been acting as an insurgent, but their actions would have been heroic. However, as this example
suggests, outright insurgency is only morally justifiable if there is an extreme degree of bias and
moral corruption being perpetrated by the system which an individual plans to undermine. The
idea that insurgency and mere role infidelity have different requirements for justification relates
to Spooner’s above-described analogy of the person accepting the sword; Spooner’s argument
that the person offered the sword should break their promise and use it to defend, rather than to
kill, the innocent person rests on the fact that the promise was a promise to commit wrongdoing,
and therefore that it was devoid of moral force. By analogy, Spooner argues, the Constitution is a
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fundamentally pro-slavery document, so a judge’s oath to uphold the Constitution is an oath to
perpetuate the moral ill of slavery, and, as such, the oath is morally void. Applying this reasoning
to the question of insurgency, the Nazi regime was fundamentally and explicitly devoted to
anti-semitism, racism, and a host of other moral ills, so it is clear that any oaths or conditions of
office for an SS officer would be morally meaningless, which means that insurgency to resist the
aforementioned moral ills would be laudable. However, while there is a significant amount of
racial bias in the United States criminal justice system, the system is not fundamentally devoted
to upholding moral ills in the way that Spooner argued the Constitution was, let alone in the way
that the Nazi regime was, so while role infidelity within the criminal justice system is justified,
insurgency is likely not.
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Chapter 2: The Value of Role Fidelity Examined
In the foregoing section of this thesis, I argued that individual judges and prosecutors
have a moral right, and, at times, a duty, to use their offices to counteract racial bias within the
criminal justice system, even if doing so would require stepping outside of the bounds of their
official roles. Throughout the previous section, I addressed several objections to the content of
my arguments and touched on a few broad counterarguments to my position. In this section, I
will expand on these counterarguments, which point to the dangers, both moral and practical, of
stepping outside the bounds of one’s role, and I will defend my position against those arguments.
Although I will alternate between posing counterarguments to my position and defending my
position, I will begin by developing a counterargument, in the form of a defense of role fidelity.
Chapter 2.1: The “Threat to Democracy” Objection
When a judge or prosecutor in the United States makes a decision about how to handle a
given case, that decision is not made “in a vacuum;” the individual is acting within an office of
the criminal justice system, which is itself a part of the broader structure of the government,
which, in turn, is itself an instantiation of a set of laws and legal principles stemming from the
Constitution. The fact that the judicial and prosecutorial roles are so thoroughly enmeshed in the
organization of our society means that each judicial and prosecutorial decision has a variety of
impacts on our society: the actions of judges and prosecutors are representations of this country’s
democracy, both insofar as some judges and prosecutors are elected (or appointed by officials
who are themselves elected) and insofar as the judicial and prosecutorial roles exist in order to
ensure the proper enforcement of the law, which is enacted by elected officials. These roles
within the criminal justice system are further linked to the functioning of democracy because
38
they constitute one of our society’s main mechanisms for protecting democracy: if individuals,
whether voters, representatives of private companies, or government officials attempt to
perpetrate election fraud, it is the role of prosecutors to ensure that they are held accountable and
the role of judges to oversee the resulting proceedings; in some cases in which there is difficulty
determining the outcome of an election, the judiciary must decide which outcome the election
supports. These aspects of the judicial and prosecutorial roles are important to describe here
because they show how vital these roles are to the preservation and exercise of our democracy,
which is the basis of all public and private functions in our society22. Therefore, judges and
prosecutors must exercise the duties of their offices in ways that preserve public trust in those
offices, because a decline in public trust in those offices logically carries with it a decline in
public confidence in the functioning of our democracy. A further reason which spurs judges and
prosecutors to faithfully execute their roles is that these individuals owe it to the public to respect
and duly fulfill the results of democratic processes; the public not only expects that the results of
their participation in democracy will be honored, they are so guaranteed by the Constitution, so if
a law is enacted by elected representatives or through a referendum, the public has a right to see
it enforced, which creates a duty in the actors of the criminal justice system to enforce it. While
this argument, that the public has a right to see the results of their collective decision-making
duly enforced, is one reason in support of the separation of powers which underlies our system of
government, another, related reason is that the public should not be ruled by the unilateral
decisions of a few unelected individuals, which is what could happen if individual actors in the
criminal justice system began to decide matters of criminal law and public policy for themselves.
22 While I will later challenge the idea that the judicial and prosecutorial roles in fact serve the idealized function in
our democracy which is described above, I will set aside for the purposes of this thesis such views as anarchism and
other forms of anti-electoralism which reject the value of representative democracy as such.
39
This account of the importance of role fidelity for judges and prosecutors lends itself to
the following counterargument to my position: my position places supreme importance on the
fulfillment of substantive justice, to the exclusion of all else; by encouraging judges and
prosecutors to step outside of their roles if necessary to promote substantive justice, my position
encourages these actors to frustrate the efforts of their colleagues in the criminal justice system,
to betray the public by usurping the democratic processes in which they have participated, and to
undermine the public’s trust in the criminal justice system and in the functioning of this country’s
democracy. Furthermore, my position encourages judges and prosecutors to contradict not only
their oaths of office but their own reasons for accepting their respective offices: appreciation of
the judicial and prosecutorial roles includes the knowledge that justice is better administered and
society better served by a court system than by vigilantism, but judges and prosecutors who
accord with my position would be partaking in a form of vigilantism. The foregoing is
admittedly a particularly forceful claim to make against my position, so in the interest of not
setting up a straw-person of a counterargument, I will address more circumscribed forms of this
argument as I go along.
I will begin to respond to the above counterargument by returning to Cover’s writing
about the Fugitive Slave Act cases: Cover describes the ways in which judges, caught between
the contradictory impulses of role fidelity and personal, antislavery morality, tended to
exaggerate the importance of role fidelity and downplay their own discretion, so that the decision
to rule in favor of the slave owners appeared definitively correct. For example, in Miller v.
McQuerry, Judge John McLean of Ohio ruled in favor of Miller, a slave owner from Kentucky,
justifying this decision by asserting that judges could not “consider the laws of nature, and the
immutable principles of right.” He continued, “[judges] look to the law, and to the law only. A
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disregard of this by the judicial powers, would undermine and overturn the social compact”
(Miller v. McQuerry, 1849, cited in Cover, 120). Reflecting on this quote from McLean’s
opinion, Cover observes, “one has not chosen to participate in enslaving a man because of a mere
device for controlling official behavior. No, one has been compelled to participate in enslaving a
man because of fidelity to the consensual principles underlying ordered society itself” (Cover,
231, emphasis added). In this observation, Cover touches on what he calls “elevation of the
formal stakes” (229), the phenomenon in which judges tended to portray their moral duty to
maintain role fidelity, and, conversely, the likely consequences of violating role fidelity, as
greater than they actually were. Applying this point to the above counterargument to my
position, it is important to keep in mind that an individual judicial decision to violate role
fidelity, or even a pattern of decisions in certain types of cases, is unlikely to lead to the collapse
of the justice system or of our democracy. One could respond that even if role infidelity does not
“overturn the social compact,” it may “undermine it” in specific ways, to borrow Judge
McLean’s words, and I will address this response later in this section. Nevertheless, Cover’s
point about the elevation of the formal stakes serves to illustrate that judges’ assertions about the
importance of role fidelity are often influenced by their own social and psychological incentives
to exculpate themselves.
Beyond elevation of the formal stakes, Cover writes, judges also tried to mitigate the
difficulty of their positions by “retreating to formalism” (229), a term which Cover deliberately
chose due to its similarity to the oft-used phrase “appealing to formalism.” The judicial role
includes (and was, at the time of the FSA cases, commonly understood to include) the
consideration of various factors, including the text of the positive law, the intentions of the
lawmakers, the coherence of each potential outcome with the body of precedent and with the
41
Constitution, and the moral status of each potential outcome. While there is no one method of
negotiating between these factors which is universally considered correct, each judge must apply
some method in each case, so personally abolitionist judges were incorrect when they asserted
that respect for their formal roles mechanistically compelled them to decide in favor of the slave
owners. Referring again to the judges’ impulses to ease their social and psychological plights,
Cover comments “the more mechanical the judge’s view of the process, the more [they]
externalized responsibility for the result” (Cover, 234). Although this point of Cover’s does not
lend itself to a defense of true role infidelity, it serves as a reminder that the judicial and
prosecutorial roles inherently involve some amount of discretion and that respect for role fidelity
may be consistent with various outcomes in a given case.
Even though, as the previous paragraphs indicate, there are social and psychological
reasons which may motivate actors in the criminal justice system to exaggerate the importance of
role fidelity, there are nevertheless arguments to be made in favor of role fidelity which do not
rely on these types of reasons. Accordingly, I will now take a step back and examine several
arguments in favor of obedience to authority in general. I will also intersperse critiques of those
arguments and reasons why those arguments are insufficient to morally prohibit role infidelity in
the types of cases in which I encourage it.
Chapter 2.2: The Rawlsian Objection
The first argument in favor of obedience to authority which I will examine comes from
John Rawls’ paper titled “Two Concepts of Rules.” In this paper, Rawls asserts a distinction
between the justification of a practice in general and the justification of a particular action taken
under a practice, and asserts that people tend to overlook this distinction. Rawls attributes
people’s failure to distinguish between these two types of justifications to people’s reliance on
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the wrong conception of rules: people tend to rely on a “summary conception” of rules, states
Rawls, under which rules are “summaries” of previous cases in terms of the amounts of net
utility produced by different courses of action in those cases. Under this conception, rules have a
purely instrumental value, to be followed only in cases in which following them is likely to
produce more net utility than disobeying them - including, in this utilitarian calculus, any
disutility which would result from the social effects of people learning that a rule was broken in a
given case. This conception, Rawls holds, is errant, because rules develop as restraints on
practices, practices which, therefore, do not include the option to engage in the type of utilitarian
consideration described above. Rawls offers the practice of making promises as an example:
while a rule utilitarian would assert that one must keep one’s promises because of the social
value of general trust in the practice of making promises and an act utilitarian would respond that
in many cases, the utility gained by breaking a promise would outweigh any utility lost due to the
social effects of breaking that promise, Rawls contends that both of these agents would be
wrong, for the following reason: while the practice of making promises may have developed
within the human population due to its utility, now that the practice exists and, by definition,
entails that one who makes a promise must keep it, an agent is preempted from engaging in
utilitarian consideration about whether to keep their promise in a given case.
To apply this argument to my position, one would hold that while the roles of judge and
of prosecutor exist for certain reasons, including the promotion of justice, the protection of
society, and the fulfillment of the will of the people, now that those roles exist and have certain
boundaries, it is simply not available to an individual judge or prosecutor to deliberate whether to
respect or to trespass those boundaries, even if the individual were tempted to trespass the
boundaries of their role in order to better serve the aforementioned reasons for their role’s
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existence. I would respond that the judicial and prosecutorial roles themselves are poorly
equipped to handle certain types of cases: specifically, cases in which racial bias has already had
a significant effect. Whereas, to use the above-described example, the practice of keeping
promises is valuable, so an individual must not violate this valuable practice even in an instance
in which breaking a promise would create greater utility than would keeping a promise, the
judicial and prosecutorial roles have a flaw, or a gap, when it comes to racial bias; insofar as
those roles are meant to prevent or to combat racial bias, they are not valuable, so an individual
criminal justice official who steps outside of their role in order to combat racial bias does not
commit an error in the way in which someone who decides not to keep a particular promise
commits an error.
Rawls, however, preempts this type of response: he accounts for the fact that any practice
is likely to have circumstances in which it does not apply by pointing out that the rule which
defines the practice need not be monolithic; a well-designed rule includes certain exceptions to
the practice, so that agents would still be obeying the rule even if they are not carrying out the
practice in a given case. Applying this point to my argument, Rawls could point out that the
judicial and prosecutorial roles are not unitary practices, blind to racial bias, but dynamic roles
which include measures to counteract bias, racial or otherwise: judges, for example, preside over
the selection of jurors, a process which specifically weeds out biased individuals; judges instruct
jurors to make a decision based on the facts of the case alone and set aside any personal feelings
about the moral value of the defendant or of the alleged crime; judges may have racially
prejudicial remarks stricken from the record or may even declare a mistrial due to such remarks;
both judges and prosecutors swear an oath to uphold the Constitution, which includes protecting
citizens’ rights to equal protection under law. All of these measures, Rawls would point out,
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serve to counteract racial bias, but they are built into the boundaries of the judicial and
prosecutorial roles.
Returning to the content of the paper, Rawls asserts that the performance of many
practices logically depends on obedience to the rules of those practices, so that one’s action
would not make sense if it diverged from the rules. To illustrate this point, Rawls uses the
example of the game of baseball: one can swing a bat, throw a ball, and run along dirt paths
without accepting the rules of baseball, but one cannot make a double-play or get an RBI without
accepting the rules of baseball, because these phenomena only having meaning within the rules
of the game23.
Now that I have explained Rawls’ argument, I will point out why his argument does not
effectively challenge my position. First, in response to the point that the judicial and
prosecutorial roles do not include deliberation about whether to respect or trespass the
boundaries of those roles, I would employ an analogue of the arguments used by escaped slaves’
lawyers in FSA cases: even if the judicial and prosecutorial roles preempt such deliberation,
what is at issue is whether to respect or violate those roles themselves. To restate Cover’s
description of the lawyers’ arguments, “the formal restraints are under challenge and cannot be
justified by mere reiteration” (Cover, 129).
Second, Rawls’ point that well-designed rules include exceptions to the relevant practices
is tantamount to expressing a hope that rule-makers include all of the exceptions that they
should, but it does not respond to the problem that a given rule does not necessarily include all of
these exceptions. Applying this to the Rawlsian objection to my position, while certain measures
to counteract racial bias are part of the judicial and prosecutorial roles, these measures are clearly
insufficient, because they coexist with the racially biased procedures and outcomes which form
23 Rawls, John, “Two Concepts of Rules,” Duke University Press, 1955.
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the empirical background of this thesis. Therefore, Rawls’ point that a well-designed rule ought
to include certain exceptions is not responsive to my position, because my position focuses
specifically on cases in which the “built-in” exceptions have failed to counteract racial bias. One
could further object that there are procedures for changing the boundaries of the judicial and
prosecutorial roles - such as encouraging one’s elected representatives to try to change the laws
governing the criminal justice system or submitting a brief to an appellate court or the Supreme
Court - but these procedures do not include an individual judge or prosecutor unilaterally
changing the boundaries of their role in the middle of a case. However, I am not opposing
individual criminal justice officials availing themselves of these established procedures to change
the boundaries of their own roles, nor am I suggesting that those individuals can simply decide to
reform their roles as they see fit during each case; rather, I am suggesting that given the current
state of the judicial and prosecutorial roles, in which those roles are not sufficient to combat
racial bias, individuals are morally justified in stepping outside of their roles when necessary in
order to prevent racially biased outcomes.
Third, while Rawls is correct in his assertion that some practices, such as playing
baseball, are defined in terms of the rules which circumscribe them, not all practices are so;
returning to Cover’s two analogies of the law - the law as chess game and the law as language -
taking another player’s pawn only makes sense in the context of the rules of chess, while using a
neologism or non-standard syntax still makes sense even though it skirts the rules of the
language. To reiterate the relationship between these two analogies and my argument, one may
feel that a judge or prosecutor is “speaking law poorly” by trespassing the boundaries of their
role, but, contrary to Rawls’ argument, such a judge or prosecutor’s actions would not “lack
meaning.”
46
At this point, one could offer the rejoinder that while the actions of a judge or prosecutor
who violated role fidelity would not “lack meaning” in the strong sense of being meaningless as
actions within the criminal justice system, these actions might still “lack meaning” in the weaker
sense of being divorced from the legitimate authority of the actors who performed them; this
objection would hold that if a judge or prosecutor violates role fidelity in deciding whether to
prosecute someone, how to sentence someone, or what evidence to admit, their decisions are
still, as a practical matter, legally binding, but they are nevertheless not the actions of a judge or
prosecutor. Rather, the objection would continue, these decisions are the actions of a vigilante
whose authority the criminal justice system upholds due to a mechanical fluke, and in this sense
these actions “lack meaning.” I would have no response to such a rejoinder except to assert that
as this thesis goes on, I will demonstrate that role infidelity is sometimes justified, even if it does
constitute vigilantism.
Chapter 2.3: The Value and Nature of Authority
For another type of argument in favor of obedience to authority and to rules, I will turn to
Scott Shapiro’s paper “Authority.” In this paper, Shapiro elaborates several models of authority,
describing what obedience to each one would entail, and uses these descriptions to form critiques
of the various models and comparisons between them. As “Authority” contains too many distinct
arguments for me to summarize here, I will lay out the overarching themes of the paper and then
address the specific points in the paper which relate to my position: Shapiro evaluates different
models of authority by applying each one to the two main “paradoxes of authority.” One of these
is the paradox of autonomy, which stems from the inconsistency of an agent both acting on their
own will and acting on the will of the authority, and the other is the paradox of rationality, which
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stems from the inconsistency of an agent both acting on their own interpretation of the balance of
reasons and acting on the will of the authority. Across several conceptions of authority, Shapiro
shows that it is difficult to reconcile the peremptory character of authoritative directives, which is
a mainstay of different conceptions of authority, with the autonomy and/or rationality of the
agents who are subject to those directives.
Shapiro notes that among means of putting authoritative directives into practice, ideology
is more effective than the threat of punishment; using the example of laws as authoritative
directives, most people follow the law most of the time, which introspection and common sense
tell us is not because most people constantly weigh the risks of getting punished against the
rewards of breaking the law, but because individuals have internalized the prevailing social
norms against breaking the law. If these norms were absent, the criminal justice system would
become overwhelmed and be unable to create sufficient deterrents from breaking the law.
Conversely, in order for the criminal justice system to create any deterrent to crime, a critical
mass of actors within that system must ideologically support the authority which they work to
enforce, because if each actor within the system were only to obey authority to the extent that
they felt it necessary in order to avoid punishment, the criminal justice system would likely
collapse24. Shapiro sums up the above two points by asserting that, “it is simply not possible to
have ‘threats all the way down’” (Shapiro, 24-25).
This point could be used as a counterargument to my position because it shows that the
ability of the criminal justice system to complete its valuable role in our society is vulnerable to
“insurgency,” or individual actors using their offices to contradict the will of the authority. Such
insurgency is a threat to the functioning of the criminal justice system not only insofar as it
24 Shapiro, Scott, “Authority,” 2000. - Although neither Shapiro nor I present empirical evidence to support these
claims, they are based on fairly self-evident political and social observations, so I will assume that they are true.
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directly frustrates the will of the authority, but also insofar as it disrupts coordination between
actors within the system. Using Shapiro’s point, if not enough actors within the system
ideologically support the authority, there is no way to bring the “insurgents” back in line, because
the insurgents would have compromised the very system responsible for enforcing the rules.
The inability of the criminal justice system to right itself once significantly compromised
would likely play out in the form of what Shapiro terms “coordination problems;” some plans
only work if all of the actors involved coordinate their behavior, so the value of an individual’s
conforming to the plan comes not from the direct results of their action, but from the aggregate
result achieved when everyone conforms to the plan. Shapiro illustrates this phenomenon using
the example of driving: there is no reason why driving on one side of the road is better than
driving on the other, but once a society has arbitrarily chosen the side of the road on which
people will drive, there is immense value in everyone following suit. It would be preposterous
for one to suggest that given dire enough circumstances, it is acceptable to drive on the wrong
side of the road, because even a tiny fraction of drivers going the wrong way would destabilize
our system of transportation25. Similarly, directives from the authority are what lend coordination
to the actions of different officials within the criminal justice system, so if insurgents were to
compromise the practice of obeying the authority, the actions of everyone within the system
would become uncoordinated; each actor who wanted to conform to the will of the authority
would have to alter their actions so as to predict and counteract the divergent behavior of the
insurgents, and the insurgents would have to modify their own actions likewise in order to
counteract the measures taken by their role-conforming colleagues. The result of this mutual
25 One could respond to this example by pointing out that in some cases, such as when a natural disaster is affecting
an area and people must evacuate, it is acceptable to drive on the wrong side of the road. The rejoinder (echoing
Rawls) would be that in those circumstances, the authority has made clear that the usual practice has been altered, so
all drivers’ behavior remains coordinated, even though it is coordinated around an abnormal practice.
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distrust and attitude of gamespersonship would not be the bulk of actors conforming to the will
of the authority and a few actors diverging from that will; rather, the result would be the type of
chaos which wrong-way drivers would cause on the road.
I would defend my position against the above argument by stating that although
coordination problems can seriously undermine the value of an institution, it seems unlikely that
role infidelity, applied in the circumstances in which my position encourages it, would in fact
lead to the utter breakdown in coordination such as the one described above. I believe that this is
the case because actors in the criminal justice system already engage in a certain amount of
gamerspersonship and the system has not, as a result, descended into chaos. Prosecutors, for
example, regularly bring more charges (and more serious charges) than they will likely be able to
prove in court, so that either the defendants plead guilty to some of the charges (or lesser
charges) or the jury convicts on some of the charges. Conversely, defense attorneys are
sometimes able to arrange for their clients to plead guilty to lesser charges than the original
charges (even if their client did not actually commit the elements of the lesser charge). Judges
and juries, as well, sometimes reject the harshness with which the prosecutors have decided to
charge the defendants or the severity of the punishments mandated by law and accordingly find
that there is insufficient evidence to convict the defendant for such serious charges, even when
the evidence is actually sufficient. These are just a few of the measures which criminal justice
officials take in order to “game” the system and produce outcomes which they prefer, and thus
far these measures have not produced “wrong-way-driver-like” chaos, so it is safe to assume that
the addition of the anti-racist role infidelity which I suggest would not cause such chaos.
The objector could further assert that even if role infidelity did not cause the type of
chaos which Shapiro describes, it could still cause a certain amount of disorganization, which
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would undermine the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. My response would be that in
certain circumstances, such as those in which maintaining role fidelity would allow severely
racially biased outcomes, the value of stepping outside of one’s role would outweigh any
negative effects which role infidelity would have on the system as a whole. I would maintain this
position because, as I assert above, officials frequently leverage specific aspects of their roles in
order to promote certain outcomes and it has not severely impacted the organization of the
criminal justice system, so it is unlikely that the role infidelity which I suggest would cause
enough disorganization to outweigh its anti-racist benefits. Furthermore, the role infidelity which
I encourage could actually increase organization in a positive way: if, for example, prosecutors
learned that when they disproportionately charge people of color under a certain statute, judges
were likely to counteract their efforts through role infidelity, prosecutors might work to make
their patterns of charging defendants more egalitarian, in order to avoid losing cases and getting
in unnecessary conflict with judges. Similarly, if legislators saw that prosecutors were refusing to
charge suspects under statutes whose impact or creation seems racially biased, the legislators
might respond by removing or reforming the racially biased statutes26.
In “Authority,” Shapiro elaborates Joseph Raz’ “normal justification thesis” in a way that
supports my position: the normal justification thesis holds that an authority is legitimate if agents
would more often conform to the balance of preexisting reasons which applied to them by
obeying the authority than by deliberating how to act themselves. Under this thesis, the authority
need not outperform each individual’s judgment in each case in order to be legitimately
authoritative in that case; if each individual were to deliberate about the balance of reasons in
26 Idealistic as this suggestion may seem, I believe that examples of this kind of positive organization in the criminal
justice system exist. For example, the increasing legalization of marijuana, at the legislative level, is arguably due in
part to the actions of prosecutors who refuse to charge people for marijuana-related crimes and of judges who refuse
to sentence people who have been convicted for such crimes.
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each case and only obey the authority if the authority had come to the correct outcome in that
case, the instrumental value of the authority for the entire group of subjects would be
undermined. Nor can each individual consider obedience to authority valuable in itself and place
that value alongside the balance of reasons while deciding how to act, asserts Raz, because the
authority arrives at directives by considering the balance of reasons, so by placing the value of
following a given directive alongside the reasons which informed that directive, one would
“double count” certain reasons.
Shapiro uses Raz’ example of arbitration to demonstrate why the normal justification
thesis has the features which it does; two parties enter into arbitration because they agree that
doing so will produce an outcome which more fairly reflects the balance of reasons than any
outcome which the parties could produce by themselves. Therefore, holds Raz, each party must
relinquish their power to consider the balance of reasons and place that power entirely in the
hands of the arbitrator, so that the outcome announced by the arbitrator now has the compulsory
force which the underlying reasons would have had. Clearly, this arrangement only works if both
parties respect the arbitrator’s decision, regardless of whether they feel it accurately reflects the
balance of reasons, because if both parties must agree that the decision reflects the balance of
reasons, the situation collapses into the status quo from before the parties entered into arbitration.
While each party must be willing to accept “great mistakes” in the arbitrator’s reasoning, each
party need not be willing to accept “clear mistakes” in that reasoning; while a great mistake is
one which “deviates greatly from the balance of reasons and whose detection as an error requires
the agent to deliberate on the underlying dependent reasons putatively supporting the claim,” a
clear mistake is one which “may not deviate substantially from the balance of reasons but wears
its error on its face” (Shapiro, 36). To put this abstract distinction into concrete terms, Raz gives
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the example of arbitration over the sum of two integers: if an arbitrator were to make a great
mistake and decide that the sum of five and three was thirty-four, neither party could fairly
dispute it, because to dispute it would be to reconsider the balance of reasons and thus to nullify
the arbitration. If, however, the arbitrator were to make a clear mistake and decide that the sum
of five and three was seven-and-a-half, the parties could dispute it, because the knowledge that
the sum of any two integers will be an integer exists independently of the balance of reasons in
the specific case. Conversely, Raz states that if the arbitrator was not truly considering the
balance of reasons, as would be the case if the arbitrator was incapacitated or had been bribed,
the parties need not respect the arbitrator’s decision, because that decision would not truly reflect
and replace the preexisting reasons.
This caveat in Raz’ normal justification thesis supports my position, because while a
given judge or prosecutor ought to accept that other actors in the legal system sometimes make
mistakes, including “great mistakes,” a judge or prosecutor need not accept that other actors will
make “clear mistakes.” Given that the United States’ criminal justice system explicitly operates
on the principle of racial non-discrimination, decisions which are motivated by racial bias
constitute clear mistakes, in the Razian sense, so judges and prosecutors need not honor those
decisions. For example, it is the role of legislators, not that of prosecutors, to decide which laws
to implement, so, in order to respect the authority of the legislators, a prosecutor must enforce
even those laws which the prosecutor feels do not best serve the interests of the people. If,
however, a given law is clearly meant to preserve racial inequality, a prosecutor need not enforce
it, because the prosecutor need not infringe on the authority of the legislators in order to
conclude that the law does not seek to reflect legitimate reasons. One may object to this example
by pointing out that there is no simple, “mathematical” way to determine whether a given law is
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meant to preserve racial inequality, while there is such a way to determine whether the supposed
sum of two integers could be the correct answer.
I would respond that while this objection makes a good point, it is only reason to refine
the practice of engaging in role infidelity, rather than reason to entirely forswear that practice; the
prosecutor from the example should not refuse to enforce a law simply because that law may
have unequal impacts on different races, but if, on the opposite extreme, the law is clearly written
so as to have unequal impacts, the legislators who proposed it touted it for these unequal impacts,
and those legislators ran for office promising to preserve racial inequality, the prosecutor can be
sufficiently certain of the racial bias behind the law that they would be justified in refusing to
enforce it. Another objection to this example would be that it is the role of judges, not that of
prosecutors, to determine whether a given law is meant to preserve racial inequality, and if a law
is in fact meant to preserve such inequality, it is the role of judges to strike it down. My response
would be that the existence of the judiciary simply means that there are two sources of authority
which may either be truly deliberating about the balance of reasons or may be acting so as to
preserve racial inequality; if there is sufficient reason to believe that a given judge or relevant
portion of a panel of judges which fails to strike down a given law is motivated by racial bias, the
prosecutor need not consider the judicial approval of the law as conclusive evidence that the law
is not meant to preserve racial inequality. Admittedly, what such “sufficient reason” would
consist of in the case of the judiciary poses a tougher problem than it does in the case of the
legislature, because judicial opinions tend to be more firmly grounded in legal reasoning and
therefore tend to be less overtly politically or racially motivated than are legislator’s statements
about a given law.
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In “Authority,” Shapiro also evaluates Raz’ “preemption thesis,” which holds that the
directives of a legitimate authority not only give the subjects of those directives reasons to obey
the directive, they also nullify or make irrelevant any reasons for disobedience. Raz suggests that
the preemption thesis follows from the normal justification thesis, because, as described above,
the social value of an authority only exists if the subjects treat the authority’s directives as
reflecting and replacing the balance of reasons in each case; if authoritative directives did not
preempt whatever reasons each agent believes apply to them, the agents would not benefit from
the authority’s generally-superior ability to consider the balance of reasons. Furthermore, Raz
asserts, each agent cannot treat the authoritative directive as a reason in itself and place it
alongside the other reasons when making a decision, because if the authoritative directive is
meant to reflect other reasons, the agent will inadvertently “double-count” some reasons. Shapiro
responds to the point about “double-counting” reasons by arguing that an agent need not treat the
authoritative directive as a monolithic, unitary reason; instead, the agent could consider the
process which led to the directive, identify any relevant reasons which were omitted or
considered improperly by the authority, and arrive at a decision which more accurately reflects
the balance of reasons.
While an agent’s consideration of the relevant content-dependent reasons could
outperform the authority’s consideration of those reasons in a given case, there is still something
to be said for a content-independent reason to obey authoritative directives, especially when
there are separate moral reasons to obey those directives (such as the earlier-described reasons
for judges and prosecutors to honor the decisions of the legislature and of actors in the criminal
justice system). However, as Shapiro asserts, there can be a content-independent reason to obey
which carries a finite weight, so that each agent can respect the authority qua authority and still
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disobey a given authoritative directive if the content-dependent reasons for disobedience are
great enough. Shapiro states that “the benefit of [such accounts of authority], therefore, is that
they attempt to account for [the] virtues of relying on authority without succumbing to the vice
of rule-worship” (Shapiro, 50). This idea parallels Dworkin’s idea of principles pointing in a
specific direction with a certain weight and therefore being binding even if each principle is not
determinative of the outcome in each case. In a case in which a prosecutor or judge feels that the
relevant legislation or the actions of another actor in the criminal justice system have been
skewed by racial bias and therefore do not properly reflect the content-dependent reasons in that
case, the prosecutor or judge could consider whether the extent of the racial bias is sufficient to
outweigh the content-independent reason which the prosecutor or judge has to maintain role
fidelity and honor the result of the case.
In a similar vein as Raz’ preemption thesis, Shapiro elaborates his own distinction
between the “decision and constraint models” of authority: under the decision model (to which,
Shapiro asserts, both Raz and his critics subscribe), an agent must make a decision about each
action which they take, and different conceptions of authority represent different ways in which
authoritative directives affect the agent’s decision-making process. Raz’ conception of authority
holds that authoritative directives give preemptive reasons for an agent to decide to obey, while
Raz’ critics hold that authoritative directives give reasons to decide to obey which are
content-independent but not preemptive or, under another stance, which are no reason at all to
obey beyond the content-dependent reasons which already applied to the agent. Shapiro,
however, contends that all of these conceptions of authority are incorrect, because authority
conforms to a constraint model, under which an agent who has submitted to an authority has no
choice but to obey the authority’s directives going forward; the issuance of such a directive does
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not change the set of reasons which apply to an agent or change the way in which the agent
should consider those reasons, rather the issuance of the directive removes the reasoning process
entirely and replaces it with the will to complete the directive.
Returning to the example of arbitration as the paradigm case of the exercise of authority,
Shapiro asserts that authority conforms to the constraint model rather than to the decision model
because whereas the decision model portrays the authority as a mediator, the constraint model
portrays the authority as an arbitrator. While a mediator helps parties come to a solution which
serves each party better than any solution which the parties could have agreed on without the
mediator, an arbitrator lays out solutions which, given that the parties agreed to arbitration, are
morally binding on the parties; a mediator is only valuable insofar as they lay out solutions
which are, in each case, better than those which the parties could have come to alone, but an
arbitrator is valuable because its existence leads to better outcomes overall than its nonexistence,
even if, in some cases, the solutions which the arbitrator lays out are not as good as those which
the parties could have come up with alone. The social value of the arbitrator comes not only from
the arbitrator’s ability to lay out better solutions than the parties under its purview most of the
time, but also from the arbitrator’s tendency to prevent the detrimental social conflict which
would exist if parties had to work out problems amongst themselves.
A government which acted as mediator would, according to Shapiro, be a Platonic
government, because the officials would have their positions not because of the input of the
populace, but because of their ability to make decisions which would benefit the populace, and it
would be this ability to benefit the populace which would lend legitimacy to the government. By
contrast, a government which acted as arbitrator would be a democratic government, because the
officials would have their positions because of the input of the populace, and it would be this
57
input which would lend legitimacy to the government. Shapiro asserts that obeying the directives
of a government acting as arbitrator is important because “deference to democratically elected
authority is deference to a power-sharing arrangement that is socially necessary, empowering and
fair. By disobeying, subjects are unilaterally, and hence unreasonably, setting the terms and
direction of social cooperation” (Shapiro, 83). However, as the empirical claims underlying this
thesis contend, the “power-sharing arrangement” which constitutes the United States criminal
justice system is not “socially necessary, empowering, [or] fair” to people of color. Universal
“deference to democratically elected authority” on the part of judges and prosecutors, in the form
of deference to enacted laws, to the discretion of other actors in the criminal justice system, to
the decisions of jurors, etc., would therefore not serve to fulfill the social needs of people of
color, to empower them, or treat them fairly. If, under Shapiro’s view, people ought to obey
authoritative directives, even when they do not produce the substantively-best outcomes, because
obedience furthers a beneficial and equitable social arrangement, but in some cases, obedience
does not actually further such a social arrangement, there is only reason to obey authoritative
directives when they are likely to produce the substantively-best outcomes. Furthermore, the
justice system lacks the above-described beneficial characteristics largely because people of
color have been excluded from participating in “setting the terms and direction of social
cooperation,” so if disobedience to authority would serve to make the process of crafting social
cooperation more inclusive - such as in cases in which existing racial bias would further the
disenfranchisement of people of color - this disobedience ought to be commendable under
Shapiro’s view.
Chapter 2.4: Evaluating Unrestrained Role Infidelity
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Although neither Rawls, Raz, nor Shapiro were addressing the topic of this thesis in their
respective works, they all presented stances which, though different from one another, tend to
contradict the position which I defend in this thesis. Kimberley Brownlee, by contrast, presents a
stance which is not only consistent with my position, but goes even further than my position does
in encouraging criminal justice officials to prioritize substantively just outcomes. In the paper
“Legal Obligation as a Duty of Deference,” Brownlee critiques the conception of legal authority
which Philip Soper presents in A Theory of Law and uses this critique to argue that actors in the
legal system (or in the political system more generally) have a broad prerogative to step outside
the boundaries of their roles. Brownlee begins the paper by comparing the voluntarist position on
legal obligation, which holds that individuals freely subject themselves to political states and are
therefore bound by the valid legal dictates of those states, and the non-voluntarist position, which
holds that although people do not choose to subject themselves to political states, the existence of
such states is beneficial and therefore the dictates of those states are binding. Brownlee quickly
dismisses the voluntarist position on the grounds that it does not reflect the social or historical
reality and then begins to examine what would be necessary for legitimate legal obligations to
exist under the non-voluntarist position; Soper’s argument, as described by Brownlee, holds that
a person is obligated to obey the dictates of the political state in which they live because the
existence of that state is better than its non-existence, insofar as the existence of the state more
effectively promotes an individual’s previously-held values than would the state’s non-existence.
The problem with this argument, as Brownlee points out, is that an individual, such as an
anarchist, may deny that the existence of the state is overall better than its non-existence, and,
conversely, an individual may deny that the existence of the state more effectively promotes the
individual’s own values than would the state’s non-existence. Soper’s position resists this
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objection, however, because it holds that one must view the legislators with “good faith” and
assume, unless there is strong evidence to the contrary, that the legislators are working to
promote values which are, by their own lights, beneficial to the members of the state. By
deferring to the legislators in this way, Soper holds, one is maintaining consistency with one’s
own values, because one is upholding an arrangement in which, were the roles reversed, the
legislator would view the citizen with “good faith” and defer to the citizen’s dictates.
The problem with Soper’s semi-Kantian, deference-based view is, as Brownlee points
out, that the state’s dictates may not only promote values which differ from one’s own values,
they may promote values which directly contradict one’s own values; if deference is ultimately
based on maintaining consistency with one’s own values, it cannot include acting so as to
contradict those values. Not only do the dictates of the state fail to carry a preemptive reason for
obedience (to borrow a term from Raz), they fail to carry any content-independent reason for
obedience, because if a given dictate contradicts an individual’s values and, under the
non-voluntarist position, those values are what compel obedience to the the state’s dictates, the
individual has no reason at all to obey the dictate (beyond any content-dependent reasons which
previously existed). It is especially important to understand the relationship between the state’s
authority and individuals’ values in this way, Brownlee holds, because the state, unchecked by
the values of individuals, could contradict the purpose of its own existence and produce results
which are worse than those which would occur if the state did not exist. Brownlee illustrates this
point as follows:
Suppose, for example, the legislator enacts a law intended to render a particular
group of persons, such as the disabled or the elderly, vulnerable to certain kinds of
treatment such as sterilisation or non-voluntary euthanasia. Such a law could
render those persons more vulnerable to certain forms of abuse and harm than
they would be in a state of nature which lacks the institutional mechanisms to
implement chosen practices'' (Brownlee, 595).
60
Applying this idea to the racial bias which exists in the criminal justice system, although that
bias is not a “chosen practice” is itself, it is certainly the result of chosen practices and the ways
in which those practices are implemented, and it could not exist in its present form outside of the
context of the criminal justice system; tragically, hate crimes against people of color have been
and continue to be perpetrated by individuals and groups, but no individual or
privately-organized group could amass billions of dollars and use those funds to detain and
incarcerate hundreds of thousands of people27. If an individual judge or prosecutor’s reason for
obeying the dictates of the state is to facilitate the state’s promotion of values which the
individual already held, an individual who held the value of racial equality would have no reason
at all to obey those dictates of the state which would promote racial inequality, especially if those
dictates would promote a level of racial inequality greater than would be possible in a stateless
world.
In the paper “Responsibilities of Criminal Justice Officials,” Brownlee takes the above
position a step further, asserting that there need not be evidence of present or likely future
substantive injustice in order to justify role infidelity by criminal justice officials; rather,
Brownlee claims, there only needs to be a conceptual gap between the performance of one’s
defined role and the promotion of substantive justice. Brownlee defends this claim by elaborating
the concept of a “moral role,” the set of moral responsibilities and prerogatives which one
shoulders in virtue of their having a specific office or social function, but which is not
necessarily coextensive with the official boundaries of that office or social function. A doctor, for
example, could be said to have a greater duty to help strangers who are having medical
27 Of course, it is not as though there is a fund in which billions of tax-dollars are used explicitly for the
incarceration of people of color en masse, but, given the empirical claims which underlie this thesis, it is reasonable
to assert that the criminal justice system produces racially biased results beyond anything which an individual or
private group could achieve.
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emergencies, even if those emergencies occur when the doctor is not at work, than does a
layperson, because the doctor’s moral role includes a duty to care for the sick. Given that each
office within the criminal justice system exists in order to promote the fulfillment of a certain
moral role, Brownlee holds, each person who holds such an office has an obligation to fulfill the
moral role specific to that office and has no pro tanto obligation to respect the boundaries of their
official role (which Brownlee terms “office dictates”). The office of judge, for example, exists in
order to promote just outcomes in cases and in order to ensure that all parties in a case receive
equal treatment and ability to advocate their position before the court. An individual judge’s
obligation, according to Brownlee, is to strive to fulfill the above-described goals which motivate
the existence of the office of judge, not to merely complete the dictates of that office. Therefore,
under Brownlee’s view, in contrast with mine, an actor within the criminal justice system should
not engage in role infidelity when their personal moral beliefs contradict a given outcome which
role fidelity would bring about; rather, an actor should engage in role infidelity when it is
necessary in order to fulfill the moral role which they already possess in virtue of their office,
regardless of their personal beliefs.
Criminal justice officials’ moral roles and their official roles may be motivated by the
same beneficial impulses, Brownlee claims, but this does not mean that the office dictates are
best-designed, or even well-designed, so as to promote the fulfillment of the moral roles. One
reason for this which Brownlee provides is that the roles within the criminal justice system are
meant to be coordinated, so that if each of the individuals who hold the offices relevant to a
given case do their jobs effectively and impartially, there will likely be a substantively just
outcome. However, as both Brownlee and I have described, in many cases, at least one criminal
justice official is affected by racial bias, which means that if each other official were to simply
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adhere to their office dictates, the results would be skewed by racial bias. Given that the moral
role of judges and prosecutors excludes the perpetuation of racial bias and, as the empirical
claims underlying this thesis demonstrate, the perpetuation of such bias is consistent with a judge
or prosecutor adhering to their office dictates, Brownlee would hold that a given judge or
prosecutor has no moral reason at all to adhere to their office dictates qua office dictates.
Brownlee’s stance admittedly goes further than mine, because I believe that even if racial
bias and role fidelity are conceptually consistent, there must be evidence of actual bias which is
likely to impact a case in order to justify role infidelity in that case. Brownlee’s stance also
diverges from mine in that she asserts that while some offices in the criminal justice system have
more discretion built into them than others do, individuals who hold offices with little or no
discretion built into them should nevertheless step outside the boundaries of their roles if they
see fit. The most extreme example of this is Brownlee’s claim that a prison guard should release
or simply refuse to detain a convict whose sentence the prison guard feels is unjustified or likely
to be detrimental to the convict’s wellbeing. While a prison guard may take measures to change
sentencing guidelines and to improve the conditions in prison, such as by asking to speak as an
expert before Congress, submitting a brief to the Supreme Court, or simply voting for
representatives who support prison reform, it would severely damage public trust in the criminal
justice system if the guard were to simply let a convict go. If prison guards were to frequently
make the unilateral decision to let prisoners out, the likely result would be an increase in
vigilantism, because communities would not have reason to believe that offenders, once duly
convicted, would actually serve out their sentences.
Despite the parts of Brownlee’s argument which I feel overreach, Brownlee’s points
about moral roles and about the criminal justice system being like an ecosystem in which each
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actor’s behavior affects each other actor’s duties support my argument, as does Brownlee’s
stance about the potential social consequences of role infidelity, which is as follows: “[the]
potential costs of non-adherence for the judge and perhaps for people's confidence in criminal
justice institutions must be weighed against other costs that arise through general adherence
(including costs that should weaken people's confidence)” (Brownlee, 124). In this quote,
Brownlee points out that while role infidelity may have costs for the individual who performs it
(such as being fired or impeached) and while it may create public distrust in the criminal justice
system, role infidelity, done right28, can also serve to foster public trust in the system. If the
public sees that criminal justice officials are willing to step outside their roles when necessary in
order to promote a just outcome, rather than blithely following their office dictates even those
dictates lead to unjust outcomes, the public may feel more protected by the justice system and
feel more confident about turning to the justice system for help.
Brownlee addresses several objections to her view, and even though that view is bolder
than mine, the responses which she offers to these objections serve to support my argument. One
objection which Brownlee addresses is the “democratic procedures'' objection, which holds that
each office within the criminal justice system is situated within a democratic system, so
non-adherence to one’s office dictates on the part of the individual who holds that office
undermines the democratic system. Brownlee’s response is that non-adherence by a criminal
justice official is no more damaging to the democratic system than is civil disobedience by
ordinary citizens, which, although some would condemn it as undemocratic, is actually
pro-democratic, because it allows those deprived of the opportunity to inform democratic
28 Brownlee acknowledges that role infidelity has the potential to degrade public trust in the criminal justice system
and accordingly she lays out different ways in which an official can engage in role infidelity while minimizing any
such damage to public trust. These suggestions are varied based on the amount of discretion built into the different
official roles and the amount of publicity which they attract.
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decisions to voice their opinions about those decisions. Applying this response to racial bias in
particular, disproportionate incarceration and subjection to other punishments hinders people of
color’s ability to participate in democratic processes. More broadly, equal protection under the
law is a democratic value, so discrimination within the criminal justice system is undemocratic.
Therefore, by engaging in role infidelity when necessary to prevent racially biased outcomes, a
judge or prosecutor would be protecting, not denigrating, the democratic procedures which
govern them. This is so not only because preventing racially biased outcomes is inherently
pro-democratic, but because the individuals and communities who would otherwise have been
disenfranchised (literally and/or figuratively) by those outcomes would be better able to
participate in democratic processes if they are not subjected to mistreatment by the criminal
justice system. Furthermore, the ability of communities of color disproportionately impacted by
the criminal justice system to participate in democratic processes could help change the law and
the policies which govern the criminal justice system, so that role infidelity becomes less
necessary over time. This point relates to Brownlee’s response to the “valuable institutions”
objection.
The “valuable institutions” objection holds that non-adherence by officials is likely to
undermine and threaten the institutions within which the officials operate (in this case, the
criminal justice system), thereby threatening not only the unjust, but the just and beneficial
applications of those institutions. As Brownlee responds, role infidelity may make an institution
more valuable, because it may contribute to a shift in the norms of the institution over time, so
that eventually, officials will not need to engage in role infidelity in order to promote the most
just possible outcomes.
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Role infidelity, however, does not necessarily produce the most substantively just
outcome in each case, as one objection to this portion of my argument would point out; a judge,
for example, could sentence certain defendants more severely than others based on the judge’s
personal beliefs about which defendants are deserving of more punishment, and these personal
beliefs could lead to the judge sentencing people of color more harshly than white people,
through implicit or explicit bias. In such a case, the judge would avoid introducing racial bias
and therefore preserve greater substantive justice by remaining faithful to their role, rather than
by allowing their own beliefs to motivate role infidelity. This problem is brought into greater
relief when considering potential cases in which an individual actor’s personal beliefs would lead
them not to bias the outcome in a given case, but to bias the democratic system which affects
future cases. A Bureau of Elections official could, for example, deliberately influence an election
in favor of a racist candidate, which would not only affect the current population, but could have
long-term effects if the candidate, once in office, further undermined the democratic processes so
as to entrench themself and their political allies in power.
This line of reasoning mirrors what Brownlee terms the “incompetent official29”
objection, which holds that some officials, especially those incompetent at making moral
judgments of their own, may more effectively fulfill their moral role by adhering to their office
dictates than by trying to determine the right course of action in each case. Brownlee’s response
to this objection is that while some officials are incompetent, others are competent, and an
official competent to fulfill their moral role better by acting on their own moral judgements,
rather than by adhering to their office dictates, ought to do so, and should not fulfill their moral
29 In the examples which I present above Brownlee’s point, the hypothetical officials behave maliciously, not merely
incompetently, but for the purposes of this argument, “incompetent” means “tending to make moral decisions with
less accuracy than would be achieved by maintaining role fidelity” whether that tendency results from lack of
aptitude, implicit bias, or explicit bias.
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role suboptimally simply out of fairness or equality with their incompetent peers. I present
Brownlee’s response to the “incompetent official” objection so as to give a thorough
representation of her position, but I admittedly do not think that this response achieves its
purpose; the “incompetent official” objection gets its force from the fact that people tend to
overestimate their own competence at making moral decisions. The corollary of this fact, that a
given official who believes themself competent to engage in role infidelity may in fact be
incompetent, is the reason which the objection presents for why each official should maintain
role fidelity, and it is also, arguably, the reason why roles exist in the criminal justice system to
begin with.
Another problem with Brownlee’s response to the “incompetent official” objection, one
which also challenges the objection itself, is that an official’s competence or incompetence may
be irrelevant to the question of the whether the official is able to promote a better outcome by
engaging in role infidelity than by maintaining role fidelity. This is the case because there are
issues in the criminal justice system about which competent people can disagree. For example,
competent judges can disagree about whether the Constitution protects the right to abortion and
the right of the individual to own guns, about whether affirmative action is justified, etc. There
may be one side of either of these issues which the balance of reasons better supports, but given
that a competent official could support the other side, an official who engaged in role infidelity
based on the feeling that they “know better” about the issue would be abusing their power and
undermining the criminal justice system. Brownlee, however, provides against this problem by
including the caveat that in “non-morally-difficult-circumstances,” meaning circumstances which
do not challenge the official to engage in tough moral deliberation, role infidelity should be
limited to “occasions where an official clearly will better act as the reasons that apply to [them]
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would have [them] act when [they] attend to those reasons directly and not to the rules and
orders governing [them]” (Brownlee, 128, original emphasis). Beyond establishing that an
official should defer to their office dictates unless there is clear reason not to, which makes
Brownlee’s view easier to accept, this quote also suggests that an official has greater latitude to
engage in role infidelity when there is a moral dilemma involved than when there is not.
While this suggestion may seem counterintuitive, because the “moral difficulty” of a
situation would make it less clear what the right outcome would be, and thus would make it less
clear whether role infidelity is justified, it nevertheless makes sense; the moral difficulty of a
situation confers particular importance on bringing about the right outcome in that situation, so
an individual should have more discretion to engage in role infidelity if it is necessary to bring
about the right outcome than they should have in a less morally difficult situation. This point is
vital to my argument because it helps draw the distinction between a “free-for-all” of role
infidelity and the role infidelity in specific types of cases which I am encouraging. If, for
example, a person of color were to sue their former employer for having fired the employee
because of their race and the judge could tell that the jury was likely to find in favor of the
employer, it would not be justified under my view or, I believe, Brownlee’s, for the judge to
suppress evidence presented by the employer or otherwise attempt to skew the case in favor of
the employee, even if the employee truly had been fired because of their race. If, however, it
were necessary for the judge to engage in similar role infidelity in order to prevent a person of
color from being imprisoned because of their race, the judge would be justified in doing so,
because the potential for false imprisonment confers far greater moral difficulty and importance
on the case than does the potential for racist hiring and firing practices.
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Although there are some cases in which competent individuals can disagree, there are
also cases which are truly matters of competence and lack thereof. While I acknowledge the
gravity of the “incompetent official” objection, I nevertheless believe that role infidelity is
justified in some of these cases. One reason for this belief is that the background empirical
claims of this thesis - that there is a significant amount of racial bias in both the outcomes and
the procedures of the criminal justice system - would likely not be the case were it not for those
with racist personal beliefs or biases engaging in role infidelity. Every role within the criminal
justice system explicitly eschews racial discrimination, so for any actor in that system to allow
such discrimination to affect their decision-making would be to engage in role infidelity;
admittedly, the phrase “role infidelity” connotes a conscious decision to step outside of one’s role
and not all of the racially biased outcomes in the criminal justice system are the result of
conscious decisions, but some racially biased outcomes certainly are. Therefore, the
“incompetent official” objection cannot derive its strength from a counterfactual in which actors
with racist personal beliefs engage in role infidelity, because that counterfactual already exists.
Furthermore, role infidelity in the contexts in which I support it is justified in virtue of the fact
that it is necessary in order to counteract the effects of the role infidelity already being performed
by those with racist personal beliefs. This relates to Brownlee’s point that what is required of an
actor in order to fulfill their moral role may change based on the behavior of the other actors in
the system and may therefore stray outside of the actor’s office dictates.
A final reply to the “incompetent official” objection would be that we must assess the
actions of those who engage in role infidelity using the concept of moral luck, which holds that it
is appropriate to include certain factors beyond an individual’s control in the moral assessment of
that individual. Applying the concept of moral luck, there is nothing which is, in principle,
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morally wrong about engaging in role infidelity, but if a given person steps outside the
boundaries of their role in the criminal justice system in order to do something which is morally
wrong, the state of affairs created by their decision can be morally condemned. If, for example,
one judge believed in racial equality and another equally sincerely believed in white supremacy,
the racial egalitarian judge would bring about a morally praiseworthy state of affirs by engaging
in role infidelity while the white supremacist judge would bring about a morally condemnable
state of affairs by so doing, even though each judge was, by their own lights, bringing about the
most racially just outcome. This distinction between the two judges comes from the difference
between axiological judgments, which concern the moral value of circumstances, and deontic
judgments, which concern the moral value of actions30. Whereas, axiologically, a white
supremacist judge using their personal beliefs to impact outcomes in criminal cases is morally
condemnable, deontically, such a judge does not act wrongly by engaging in such role infidelity
motivated by sincerely-held personal beliefs, as the other sections of this thesis argue. By relying
on the distinction between axiological and deontic judgments, one can address the problem of
people potentially using role infidelity towards bad ends without perpetrating the inconsistency
of morally condemning individuals for performing the same actions which are laudable when
performed by other people.




In this thesis, I argue that judges and prosecutors have the right, and, in some cases, the
duty to step outside the formal boundaries of their roles when it is necessary in order to
counteract racial bias in the criminal justice system. I defend this conclusion in several different
ways, including by arguing that if racial bias is already present in a given case, for a judge or
prosecutor to remain within their role would be for them to allow the racial bias to impact the
outcome of the case, which would be unacceptable.
There is, however, the problem that not all judges and prosecutors personally believe in
racial equality, and that by dint of following my suggestion to step outside of their roles, some
criminal justice officials could promote the very racial bias which my thesis strives to combat.
One way in which I respond to this problem is by pointing out that my thesis would not be
relevant were it not for a substantial number of criminal justice officials who already violate the
bounds of their roles in promoting racial bias (whether they do so deliberately or not); it is this
racially biased role infidelity which makes necessary the countervailing, anti-racist role infidelity
which I encourage. In similar fashion, I respond to the problem that my suggestions would harm
democratic processes and public trust in the criminal justice system by arguing that by creating a
system in which laws are less likely to be enforced in racially biased way and in which people of
all races are likely to receive equal treatment under law, judges and prosecutors who engage in
role infidelity would actually strengthen democratic processes and public trust in the criminal
justice system.
A more general problem which my position faces is that under some views of judicial
philosophy, namely that of Ronald Dworkin, the judicial role includes the consideration of the
moral content of different outcomes in a given case, so a judge who applied such moral
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consideration would not be stepping outside of their role, but fulfilling their prescribed role. I
respond to this problem by arguing that Dworkin’s view does not afford a large enough role to
the consideration of morality, because there are some instances when even a morally-guided
interpretation of the positive law, precedent, and underlying legal principles would still produce a
racially biased outcome, and in those cases the judge or prosecutor must simply step outside of
their role in order to avert such an outcome.
While I argue that Dworkin’s view of the judicial role does not include enough moral
consideration, and therefore requires judges to step outside of their roles on occasion in order to
promote justice, I also assert that a significant degree of racial bias is necessary to justify role
infidelity. Kimberley Brownlee’s position contradicts this assertion, as she holds that so long as it
is conceptually possible for an official to promote a more just outcome by following their own
judgment than by following their role, that official, whether they are a Supreme Court justice, a
prison guard, or anyone in-between, ought to engage in role infidelity. My position does not go
as far as Brownlee’s because I believe that there must be a baseline of respect for authority and
for the boundaries of one’s role, which respect requires that an official accept the possibility that
the outcomes in some cases will not perfectly reflect justice. Therefore, under my view, one
presumptively ought to maintain their role and may only step outside of their role when the
likelihood and extent of racial bias in a given case reaches a certain threshold. I further
demonstrate that my position is consistent with respect for authority by examining and
responding to John Rawls’ and Scott Shapiro’s work about rules and authority, respectively.
Rawls holds that if one wants to make use of the value of a practice, one must respect the
rules which define the practice, although if one is willing to abandon the value of the practice,
one can simply step out of the practice entirely. This means that from a Rawlsian perspective, the
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fact that the judicial and prosecutorial roles have boundaries does not in itself prevent judges and
prosecutors from engaging in role infidelity; rather, it means that any judges or prosecutors who
engage in role infidelity are not acting as criminal justice officials, but as vigilantes. I have no
problem with my position being characterized as encouraging vigilantism, because I have shown
that the type of role infidelity which I encourage is justified, whether it is vigilantism or not.
However, I do not believe that “vigilantism” is an entirely accurate description of what I am
recommending, because it seems that judges and prosecutors engaging in role infidelity would
still be acting as representatives of the criminal justice system in a way in which true vigilantes
never do. For example, if a judge were to engage in role infidelity in order to prevent a defendant
from being imprisoned under a racially biased statute, it would seem inaccurate to assert that the
judge’s action is morally equivalent to breaking the defendant out of prison and that the only
differences between the two scenarios are superficial. The distinction between the type of role
infidelity which I suggest and vigilantism is not a trivial one, because the further an individual
must step outside of their official role when they engage in role infidelity, the less their actions
can change the boundaries of the official role for the better; if a given act of role infidelity is
understood as pushing the boundaries of the judicial or prosecutorial role, the role may change
over time to incorporate that action, but if the same act of role infidelity is understood as the
aberrant behavior of a vigilante, no such evolution of the official role is possible.
Even if departure from one’s official role does not necessarily equal vigilantism, Rawls
and Shapiro could hold, there remains the problem that if I encourage anti-racist role infidelity in
order to counteract racial bias in the criminal justice system, I ought also encourage role
infidelity geared to counteract sexism, homophobia, socioeconomic and religious discrimination,
etc. Rawls and Shapiro could assert that even if anti-racist role infidelity alone would not result
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in coordination problems within the criminal justice system, the additive effects of all of these
forms of role infidelity would lead to such problems. My response is that while I do not know
enough about the legal history of the United States to say whether the above-listed forms of role
infidelity would be warranted, I do know that anti-racist role infidelity is warranted, which is
sufficient to support my position. Furthermore, if all of the various types of role infidelity
described above are indeed warranted, this would not necessarily lead to coordination problems
and disarray within the criminal justice system, because, as I suggest earlier in this thesis, role
infidelity could lead to criminal justice officials coordinating their actions around more
egalitarian processes and goals than they currently do.
Near the beginning of the thesis, I lay out empirical evidence of the tragic extent to which
racial bias plagues the United States criminal justice system. I do not believe that, if
implemented, the type of anti-racist role infidelity which I recommend would eliminate this
racial bias, but I do believe that such role infidelity would help to combat racial bias in the
criminal justice system, which, from my point of view, makes it worthwhile.
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